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Abstract
A cognitive radio is an intelligent wireless communication system that improves
spectrum utilisation by allowing secondary users to use the idle radio spectrum
from primary licensed networks or to share the spectrum with primary users. Due to
several signicant challenges for cryptographic approaches of upper layers in protocol
stacks | for example, private key management complexity and key transmission
security issues | physical layer (PHY) security has drawn signicant attention
as an alternative for cryptographic approaches at the upper layers of the protocol
stack. Security threats may arise from passive eavesdropping node(s), which try
to intercept communications between authenticated nodes. Most recent studies
consider information theoretic secrecy to be a promising approach. The idea of
information theoretic secrecy lies in exploiting the randomness of communication
channels to ensure the secrecy of the transmitted messages. Due to the constraints
imposed on cognitive radio networks by secondary networks, allocating their
resources in an optimal way is a key to maximising their achievable secrecy rates.
Therefore, in this thesis, optimal resource allocation and secrecy rate maximisation
of cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are proposed.
Cooperative jamming is proposed to enhance the primary secrecy rate, and
a new chaos-based cost function is introduced in order to design a power control
algorithm and analyse the dynamic spectrum-sharing issue in the uplink of cellular
CRNs. For secondary users as the game players in underlay scenarios, utility/cost
functions are dened, taking into account the interference from and interference
tolerance of the primary users. The existence of the Nash equilibrium is proved in
vi
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this power control game, which leads to signicantly lower power consumption and
a relatively fast convergence rate when compared to existing game algorithms. The
simulation results indicate that the primary secrecy rate is signicantly improved by
cooperative jamming, and the proposed power control algorithm achieves low power
consumption.
In addition, an integrated scheme with chaotic scrambling (CS), chaotic
articial noise, and a chaotic shift keying (CSK) scheme are proposed in an
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)-based CR system to enhance its
physical layer security. By employing the chaos-based third-order Chebyshev map
to achieve the optimum bit error rate (BER) performance of CSK modulation, the
proposed three-layer integrated scheme outperforms the traditional OFDM system
in an overlay scenario with a Rayleigh fading channel. Importantly, under three
layers of encryption that are based on chaotic scrambling, chaotic articial noise,
and CSK modulation, a large key size can be generated to resist brute-force attacks
and eavesdropping, leading to a signicantly improved security rate.
Furthermore, a game theory-based cooperation scheme is investigated to
enhance physical layer (PHY) security in both the primary and secondary
transmissions of a cognitive radio network (CRN). In CRNs, the primary network
may decide to lease its own spectrum for a fraction of time to the secondary
nodes in exchange for appropriate remuneration. The secondary transmitter (ST)
is considered to be a trusted relay for primary transmission in the presence of
the ED. The ST forwards a message from the primary transmitter (PT) in a
decode-and-forward (DF) fashion and, at the same time, allows part of its available
power to be used to transmit an articial noise (i.e., jamming signal) to enhance
secrecy rates. In order to allocate power between the message and jamming signals,
the optimisation problem is formulated and solved for maximising the primary
secrecy rate (PSR) and secondary secrecy rate (SSR) with malicious attempts from
a single eavesdropper or multiple eavesdroppers. Cooperation between the primary
and secondary transmitters is also analysed from a game-theoretic perspective, and
vii
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their interaction modelled as a Stackelberg game. This study proves theoretically
and computes the Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical examples are provided to
illustrate the impact of the Stackelberg game-based optimisation on the achievable
PSR and SSR. The numerical results indicate that spectrum leasing, based on
trading secondary access for cooperation by means of relay and a jammer, is
a promising framework for enhancing primary and secondary secrecy rates in
cognitive radio networks when the ED can intercept both the primary and secondary
transmission.
Finally, this thesis focuses on physical-layer security in cognitive radio networks
where multiple secondary nodes assist multiple primary nodes in combating
unwanted eavesdropping from malicious eavesdroppers. Two scenarios are
considered: a single eavesdropper (scenario I) and multiple eavesdroppers (scenario
II). The secondary users act as a relay and jammer in scenario I, whereas they
act only as a jammer in scenario II. Furthermore, the multiple eavesdroppers are
distributed according to a homogenous Poison Point Process (PPP) in scenario
II. Closed forms are derived for the outage probability and mean secrecy rate
for both the primary and secondary transmissions. Furthermore, the scalability
and convergence of the matching theory are proved. Both the analytical and
numerical results show that the proposed matching model is a promising approach
for exploiting the utility functions of both primary and secondary users.
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Chapter 1
Physical layer security in cognitive
radio networks
1.1 Introduction
The radio frequency spectrum is becoming scarce due to the low utilisation
of spectrum resources under conventional xed-spectrum allocation schemes.
According to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), temporal and
geographical variations in the utilisation of the assigned spectrum range from
15% to 85% [1]. The limited available spectrum and the ineciency of spectrum
usage necessitate a new communication paradigm, cognitive radio (CR), to exploit
the exible spectrum [2]. As an intelligent wireless communication system, a
secondary transmitter can sense the radio frequency environment, adjust its transmit
parameters, such as carrier frequency, bandwidth, and transmission power, to
optimise spectrum usage, and adapt its transmission and reception accordingly.
Developing advanced transceivers for the physical layer is a key objective in the
successful deployment of CR systems. Spectrum pooling is an opportunistic
spectrum access approach that enables public access to licensed frequency bands
[3, 4]. Spectrum pooling merges spectral resources from dierent spectrum owners
(for example, military radios) into a common pool, from which secondary users
1
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may temporarily access idle spectral resources of licensed users. In this case, the
transmission of the licensed users is not inuenced by the secondary transmission,
and the licensed system remains the same. Broadcast, a fundamental characteristic
of the wireless network, causes several challenges for ensuring secure communications
in the presence of eavesdroppers. The broadcast nature of wireless communications
makes it dicult to shield the transmitted signals from illegal recipients. As a
consequence, attackers are well-known and modeled either as (1) an unauthorised
receiver (eavesdropper) that attempts to extract information from the receiving
signal of a legal transmission without being detected, or (2) a malicious transmitter
(jammer) that sends a jamming signal to degrade the signal-to-noise ratio at
the legal receiver [10, 35]. Recently, physical layer (PHY) security has attracted
signicant attention as an alternative for cryptographic algorithms at the upper
layers of the protocol stack in secure communication systems [36{38]. Security
threats may be induced by passive eavesdropping node(s) which try to intercept
communication between authenticated nodes. Traditionally, there have been several
signicant challenges for cryptographic approaches of upper layers in protocol stacks,
such as private key management complexity, key distribution obstacles, and key
transmission security issues. Recent years have seen the development by Wyner
in [39] of a promising approach for achieving secure communications: information
theoretic secrecy. The power of information theoretic secrecy lies in exploiting the
randomness of communication channels to ensure secrecy for transmitted messages.
In this chapter, an overview is provided of existing algorithms and methods
for improving PHY security in CRNs. Recent developments and challenges in PHY
security are then discussed, and nally the contributions and organisation of this
thesis are presented.
1.2 Cognitive radio technology
Among many potential technologies that enable the transmission of unlicensed
users in spectrum-pooling radio systems, OFDM-based software dened radio
2
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(SDR) provides signicant exibility for mixing the types of signal processing
elements within the system, as OFDM provides the capability to multiplex multiple
modulation types in each OFDM block. In each block, the format can be
variable, potentially providing adaptive-channel, loading, and/or hierarchical service
compensation [5]. The downlink channel assignment and power control problem
for frequency-division, multiple-access (FDMA)-based cognitive radio networks was
addressed in [6]. In the approach presented in [7], the base stations in each cell
perform spectrum access according to the opportunistic principle in order to serve
the secondary users (SUs) within their cells. Each SU can be either active or
idle and a BS needs only one channel to support each active SU. To maximise
the total number of active SUs that can be supported while guaranteeing the
minimum signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirements of SUs, as
well as protecting the primary users, suboptimal schemes are suggested for the
formulated mixed integer program. In CR networks with the coexistence of multiple
primary and secondary links via an orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access
(OFDMA)-based air interface, the approach in [8] utilised the dual method that was
proposed in [9] to provide centralised and distributed algorithms that improve the
total achievable sum rate of secondary networks subject to interference constraints
at the primary receivers. Formally, a CR is dened as a radio that can change its
transmitter parameters depending on interactions with its environment. From this
denition, two main features of cognitive radio (CR) emerge [2]. The rst feature
is cognitive capability; during real-time interaction with the radio environment, the
unused portions of the spectrum at a specic time or location can be identied. CR
enables occupation of the temporally idle spectrum according to the spectrum hole or
white space. Consequently, the desired spectrum can be selected, shared with other
users, and also exploited without interference with the licensed user. Secondly, CR
exhibits re-congurability; a CR must be programmed to communicate on dierent
frequencies and use multiple-access technologies, such as CDMA or OFDMA, as a
physical layer in the transceiver design. According to this capability, the operating
3
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parameters can be recongured to select the most appropriate spectrum. In order to
provide the aforementioned capabilities, CR requires a novel radio frequency (RF)
transceiver architecture. The main components of a CR transceiver are the radio
front-end and the baseband processing unit, originally proposed for software-dened
radio (SDR) (6.1). In the RF front-end the received signal is amplied, mixed, and
converted from analog to digital (A/D). Modulation and demodulation of signals
occurs in the baseband processing unit. Each component can be recongured via
a control bus to adapt components' parameters according to the time-varying RF
environment. The novel feature of the CR transceiver is the wideband RF front
end, which enables simultaneous sensing over a wide spectrum. RF hardware
technologies, such as a wideband antenna, power amplier, and adaptive lter, can
provide this functionality.
Figure 1.1: Architecture of a CR transceiver
.
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1.3 PHY security in CRNs
In this section, previous contributions to PHY security in CRNs are discussed.
In PHY security, the gure of merit is the secrecy rate, which is dened as the
dierence between the transmission rate of the source-destination link and that of
the source-eavesdropper link. However, the secrecy rate will be equal to zero if
the source-destination channel is worse than the source-eavesdropper channel. For
a Gaussian channel, the achievable secrecy rate is equal to the dierence between
the mutual information accumulated at the destination and that accumulated at
the eavesdropper (ED), which is not less than zero [40]. Recently, chaos-based
cryptography has attracted signicant attention for its implementation simplicity,
complex behaviour, and extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. In [14], the
scrambling matrix, based on a key derived from one-dimensional chaotic nonlinear
dynamic system using logistic map, was considered.Two types of receivers have been
proposed in chaos-based systems: coherent and non-coherent. In the chaotic shift
keying (CSK) system with a coherent receiver, the chaotic signal is used to carry
the data information signal, while chaotic synchronisation is required at the receiver
in order to regenerate an exact replica of the chaotic sequence and demodulate the
transmitted bits. In the dierential chaotic shift keying (DCSK) system with a
non-coherent receiver, chaotic synchronisation is not used on the receiver side [11].
In [11], it is illustrated that chaotic synchronisation poses a signicant challenge for
the demodulation process at the coherent receiver of a chaotic system.
In [21], the security performance of a DCSK system was improved by
introducing a permutation transformation in time, which hides the similarity
between the reference and data samples to make the bit rate undetectable from
the frequency spectrum. Kaiser et al. proposed a multi-carrier-DCSK (MC-DCSK)
system wherein N sub-carriers are modulated by a combined sequence between data
and reference sequences. In this system, the chips are interleaved to increase the
security of the transmission by randomly dispersing the chaotic chips of data symbols
in the time and frequency domains. Thus, a diversity of orders corresponding to N
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sub-carriers can be achieved, provided the channel oers this degree of diversity [22].
After eliminating the guard interval, OFDM demodulation, and chip de-mapping,
the received signal is correlated to a delayed version (of the received signal) and
summed over the symbol duration with any channel gains in the receiver being
unknown. The received bits are estimated by computing the sign of the output of
the correlator.
The proposed MC-DCSK system is robust against multipath fading [23], [24],
and achieves enhanced secure transmission with suppressed narrowband interference.
Many studies compute the bit error rate (BER) performance of MC-DCSK by
considering the transmitted bit energy as constant [11] [26]. This approximation,
widely known as the Gaussian approximation (GA), suers from low precision when
the spreading factor is low [27]. Kaddoum et al. in [29] extended the Gaussian
approximation (GA) in [28] to compute a BER expression for the MC-DCSK in an
m distributed fading channel, taking into account the variation of the bit energy
after spreading by the chaotic signal. Note that these studies only considered a single
layer of security represented by DCSK to provide protection against brute-force
attacks.
1.4 Scope of the thesis and related work
The main aim of this thesis is to improve the PHY security of cognitive radio
systems by optimally allocating their available resources. Many recent studies have
focused on the game theory-based cooperative jamming paradigm, as the open
nature of the wireless medium makes it susceptible to malicious eavesdropping.
In [41], the authors proposed cooperative jamming to counter this vulnerability
to eavesdroppers. In cooperative jamming, interference is created by the network
nodes to transmit noise or codewords that impair the ability of eavesdroppers to
decode condential information [42]. The authors in [43] considered the power
allocation optimisation problem to maximise the secrecy rate in a two-hop wireless
relay network. The authors in [44] maximised the secrecy rate of the primary
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network while satisfying a required rate for the secondary network by using an
optimal beamformer design at the secondary transmitter with multiple antennas.
The study in [45] considered the secrecy rate maximisation problem based on game
theory, whereby the jammer introduces pricing charges for its jamming service
based on the amount of interference caused to the eavesdropper. This secrecy rate
maximisation problem was formulated as a Stackelberg game with the jammer and
the legitimate transmitter playing the roles of leader and follower in the game. In
[46], the authors demonstrated that cooperative jamming leads to a substantial
improvement in the secrecy rate. This study involved multiple potential jammers,
with competition between them modelled for bandwidth access via distributed
resource allocation mechanisms, such as auctioning and the power control game.
With the goal of maximising the data transmission rate priced by the jammer's
power, the transmit power of cooperative jammers is generally proportional to the
amount of leased bandwidth. In [47], the authors considered a scenario wherein an
external eavesdropper attempts to decode the primary user's message. The primary
user allows the secondary user to share the primary user's spectrum to improve
its own secrecy rate through cooperative jamming from the secondary user. A
dierent setup is investigated in [48], in which the secondary user wants to keep
its message condential from the primary network, which means that the primary
receiver is viewed as an eavesdropper from the perspective of the secondary network.
In [49], the inner and outer bounds on the capacity equivocation region were
derived. Recently, the interactions between agents (transmitters, receivers, helpers,
and eavesdropper) in multiuser wireless networks were accurately captured by
interdisciplinary analyses based on game theory. The main function of game theory
is to model agents or players as rational entities whose sole focus to maximise their
individual gains or payo functions. In [55] and [56], a Stackelberg power-control
game was proposed for the primary-secondary interactions, whereby the primary
user permits secondary transmissions only to improve its own secrecy rate.
In [57], the authors proposed a zero-sum game between a multi-channel
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transmitter and an adversary in the form of an eavesdropper, in which the payo
was the dierence between Alice's and Eve's SINR. Using the secrecy rate as the
payo in a game theory is a relatively new concept. The authors in [58] studied
a SISO wiretap network with an adversarial jammer helping the eavesdropper as a
zero-sum game, and solved the Nash equilibrium along with the source and jammer
cumulative distribution functions. In [59] and [60], the authors considered a MIMO
wiretap channel with an active eavesdropper that could either listen or jam, and
modelled its interactions with the legal transmitter as a zero-sum game with the
MIMO secrecy rate as the payo function. In [61], the SISO one-sided interference
channel was presented, and the authors proposed a game-theoretic model wherein
the payo to each pair was their own secrecy rate, and derived the corresponding
Nash equilibrium secrecy rate region. The authors in [62] modelled a zero-sum
power allocation game between a multi-channel transmitter and a hostile jammer
distinct from the eavesdropper, considering the secrecy rate as the payo function.
Cooperative game theory was studied in [63] to demonstrate the enhancement in
secrecy capacity of an ad hoc network, when users create coalitions via collaborative
beamforming, to nullify the signals overheard by eavesdroppers. For a hierarchical
multi-hop system with dierent potential paths to the base station, a game-theoretic
framework was proposed in which a number of nodes interact and select optimal
and secure communication paths in the uplink of a wireless multi-hop network, in
the presence of eavesdroppers; a distributed tree formation game was postulated
to solve this game [64]. Han et al. [65] developed a Stackelberg game wherein a
transmitter pays a number of external helpers to jam an eavesdropper, and indicated
the corresponding equilibrium prices and convergence properties. The same authors
proposed a distributive auction game in a similar scenario in [66], to model the
transactions between transmitters and helping jammers. The authors in [67] applied
pricing functions to improve the energy eciency and sum secrecy capacity in an
M-user non-cooperative power control game. Finally, in [68], game theory was
proposed for the interaction between multiple eavesdroppers deciding whether or
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not to collude in a MISO wiretap channel. The authors then indicated the necessary
conditions for eavesdropper cooperation in an innitely repeated game.
1.5 Contributions and organisation of thesis
The main contributions of this thesis include providing methods and algorithms that
can enhance the achievable secrecy rate and secrecy outage in CRNs via cooperative
jamming with chaotic optimisation and communication, a Stackelberg game, and
matching theory. The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 3,
a resource allocation (i.e. power) scheme is proposed for spectrum leasing in underlay
CRNs to maximise the primary secrecy rate with perfect knowledge of channel state
information (CSI). A novel and ecient cost function based on a chaotic logistic
map is proposed, which guarantees convergence of the `power ' game to a unique
Nash equilibrium. Power control is achieved with a signicant reduction in power
consumption for cognitive users (by at least half compared to other methods). It
is also shown that the rate of convergence of the proposed chaotic algorithm is
relatively fast compared to existing iterative methods. In Chapter 4, three-layer
protection for CR networks is proposed. The rst and second layers provide
protection against brute-force attacks, while the third layer provides protection
against eavesdroppers. The secrecy rate and the power allocation of the proposed
C-OFDM CR networks are optimised under dierent scenarios for eavesdroppers. In
Scenario 1 with a single eavesdropper, an ecient optimisation scheme is provided
to maximise the secondary secrecy rate (SSR) under the at fading channel model.
Subsequently, the secondary power optimisation allocation problem is analysed and
solved at the secondary transmitter (ST). In Scenario 2 with multiple eavesdroppers,
an analysis is provided for the proposed CR systems under malicious attacks
from multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers that are distributed according to a
homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) around secondary transceivers. This
is to highlight the impact of multiple eavesdroppers on the primary secrecy rate
(PSR) and SSR. It is shown that the secrecy outage probability and the mean
9
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secrecy rate achieved for CR systems under the non-colluding eavesdroppers are
signicantly lower than under traditional transceivers without articial noise. In
Chapter 5, two schemes are proposed for applying the Stackelberg game to CRNs.
In Scheme 1, novel system designs are proposed for power allocation and time
allocation for primary and secondary transmissions that maximise the achievable
PSR and SSR subject to a total transmit power constraint. In Scenario I, with
a single eavesdropper, an ecient optimisation is provided that maximises both
the PSR and SSR under the at fading channel model. In particular, we analyse
and solve the primary and secondary power allocation problems at the ST using
time slot allocation of the spectrum lease. In Scenario I, the secrecy rates achieved
with the proposed 3-phase system are higher than those in other studies ([37],[39]),
which are based on an external jammer in the same geometric environment. In
Scenario II, an analysis is presented of the proposed CRNs under malicious attempts
by multiple eavesdroppers (colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers) around the
ST to highlight the impact of multiple eavesdroppers on the PSR and SSR. The
power allocation problem and time allocation problem are analysed and solved. In
Scenario II, it is shown that the secrecy rate achieved for CRNs under the colluding
eavesdropper is signicantly lower than that under non-colluding eavesdroppers.
In Scheme 2, a resource allocation (i.e., power and time resources) scheme is
proposed for spectrum leasing to maximise the primary secrecy rate (PSR), relay
secrecy rate (RSR), and secondary secrecy rate (SSR) with perfect knowledge of
channel state information (CSI). The unique value of the proposed Stackelberg
game equilibrium is obtained. It is shown that the secrecy rate of the proposed
system using a multi-level Stackelberg game is signicantly higher than that using
the single level Stackelberg game. Comparisons with previous work are provided to
show the signicant improvement to security in the proposed system. In Chapter
6, a utility-based matching framework is proposed to motivate multiple primary
nodes and multiple secondary nodes to cooperate with each other such that the
sum-secrecy rate over all source nodes is maximised. This study provides a novel
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framework that can address the general matching scenario to enhance security for
both primary and secondary transmissions. In Scenario 1 with a single eavesdropper,
matching theory and auction theory are applied to the allocated secondary power to
relay the primary message and create interference with the eavesdropper. Simulation
results show that the proposed scheme provides a signicant increase in the primary
secrecy rate (PSR) at the expense of a slight reduction in the secondary secrecy
rate (SSR) in comparison with the corresponding central algorithm. In Scenario
2 with multiple eavesdroppers, matching theory and auction theory are applied to
the allocated secondary power to create interference with the eavesdroppers. Again,
simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides a signicant increase in
the primary secrecy rate (PSR) at the expense of a slight reduction of the secondary
secrecy rate (SSR) in comparison with the corresponding central algorithm. Finally,
conclusions are drawn and future work is discussed in Chapter 6, and proofs of all
lemmas are provided in the Appendices.
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Chapter 2
Wireless Channel Models and
Physical layer Security
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, security issues in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) have been a
subject of growing interest [73],[74]. Security threats can, for example, arise in
the presence of passive eavesdropping node(s) trying to intercept communication
between authenticated nodes. A promising approach for achieving secure
communications was developed by Wyner in [75]: information theoretic secrecy. The
use of a friendly jammer to facilitate the degradation of the source-to-eavesdropper
channel has been considered (see e.g., [76],[77]). This is achieved by a friendly
jammer transmitting a jamming power signal, which has the eect of decreasing
the signal-to-noise ratio at the eavesdropper. This approach is often referred
to as cooperative jamming. In addition, multi-antenna systems have been an
important research area because they oer high data transmission and increased
reliability for wireless communications [78]. Previous studies have considered various
scenarios for the sources, destinations, jammers, and eavesdroppers. For example,
a scenario comprising a single source-destination pair, a single jammer, and a
single eavesdropper was considered in [79], while a single source-destination pair,
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multiple jammer, and single eavesdropper were considered in [80], ,[81]. The authors
in [82] considered multiple source-destination pairs and a single eavesdropper,
whereas a single source node, multiple destination nodes, and multiple eavesdroppers
were considered in [83]. Another scenario was considered in [84] with a single
source-destination pair, multiple jammers, and multiple eavesdroppers. In contrast
to the single source-destination pair or single jammer scenarios in the literature,
here the focus is on a more general scenario with multiple source-destination pairs,
multiple jammers, and a single eavesdropper. In addition, most existing studies
have assumed perfect channel knowledge from the source to the eavesdropper.
This is valid only if the eavesdropper is part of the communication system. For
example, in [85], a scenario was considered in which the receivers eavesdrop on the
message intended for other receivers. However, in some cases, the eavesdropper
may not be a user that is part of the system, and in such a case, obtaining
the eavesdropper channel information would be dicult. In this regard, physical
layer security with evesdroppers having partial or no channel state information
(CSI) was considered in [86],[88] and [87]. In underlay CRNs, a primary service
provider allows the reuse of its spectral resources by an unlicensed secondary system,
provided that a specied, maximum tolerated interference level generated by the
secondary transmitter is not violated. The open nature of the wireless medium
makes the transmission susceptible to malicious eavesdropping, and as a result,
many studies have focused on the cooperative jamming paradigm , which creates
interference at eavesdroppers [95],[96]. The authors in [95] proposed secondary
cooperation to maximise the secrecy rate of the primary network while satisfying a
required secondary rate for the secondary network. This is achieved by an optimal
design of a beamformer at the multiple-antenna secondary transmitter to generate
interference to confuse an eavesdropper. In [96], the authors proposed cooperative
jamming to counter this vulnerability caused by eavesdroppers. In cooperative
jamming, network nodes create interference to transmit noise or codewords and
thereby impede eavesdroppers' decoding of the condential information. A primary
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goal of CRNs is to provide transmission opportunities and a substantial quality
of service (QoS) for SUs, and avoid interference harmful to PUs. Thus, power
control is essential for CRNs, and has recently attracted considerable attention.
In particular, power control in traditional wireless networks has been studied
extensively. Earlier schemes, such as signal-to-noise plus interference ratio (SINR)
balancing, which was initially proposed for satellite communications and then
adapted to wireless communications, suer from slow convergence [90]. The model
in [91] proposed a cost for each mobile that consisted of a weighted sum of power
and square of SIR error, and obtained the static Nash equilibrium for the resulting
costs. Also, recent studies demonstrated the impact of channel knowledge on CR
capacity, particularly the importance of channel state information (CSI) between
the SU and the PU [93]. In [89], a new iterative algorithm was suggested using
game theory. The authors considered not only the SINR requirement, as with
other game theoretic algorithms, but also the inuence of the power threshold.
However, this algorithm suers from an increase in power consumption. A new
cost-based primary-secondary interaction model for cellular cognitive radio networks
was proposed in [94]. The authors proposed new utility and cost functions for
primary and secondary users, respectively, and additionally improved convergence
and power consumption of secondary users, with users given the opportunity to
switch between base stations. Characteristics of chaotic motion include ergodicity,
randomization, and regularity, and hence all states of the mapping function can be
traversed without repetition within a certain scope. Previous studies have applied
chaotic variables to the optimisation search and have shown that it is useful for
enhancing the convergence of random search-based optimisation [92]. The authors
in [100] considered a four-node cognitive scenario wherein the secondary receiver
(SR) is treated as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission.
The secondary transmitter can help the primary transmission, while guaranteeing
that the primary message is not leaked to the secondary user(s). The authors
investigated three dierent optimisation problems: maximisation of the primary
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secrecy rate, maximisation of the secondary rate, and minimisation of the secondary
transmit power. Furthermore, they analysed the cooperation between the primary
transmitter (PT) and secondary transmitter (ST) from a game-theoretic perspective,
in which interactions between the transmitters were modelled as a Stackelberg
game. The primary and secondary users have their own interests and thus do
not cooperate unconditionally. Non-cooperative game theory tools are a common
approach to modeling their interaction in cognitive radio networks (CRNs) with
secrecy constraints [101] or without secrecy constraints [102, 103]. An appropriate
model for such scenarios is the Stackelberg game model [104] with the game leader
selling some fraction of its spectrum and the follower awarded a share of the spectrum
for its cooperation, as in [105]. Cooperative game theory was studied in [107] to
demonstrate improvement in the secrecy capacity of an ad-hoc network when users
form coalitions to nullify the signals overheard by eavesdroppers via collaborative
beamforming. For a hierarchical multi-hop system with dierent potential paths
to the base station, a distributed tree formation game was proposed in [108]. Han
et al. [109] demonstrated a Stackelberg game in which a legal transmitter pays a
number of external helpers to jam an eavesdropper, and computed the corresponding
equilibrium prices and convergence properties. They also examined a similar
scenario in [110], in which an auction game was used alternatively to model the
transactions between transmitters and helping jammers. Anand and Chandramouli
studied an M -user non-cooperative power control game with secrecy considerations
in [111], and applied pricing functions to improve the energy eciency and sum
secrecy capacity of the network. Fakoorian et al. discussed in [112] and [113] how
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions and zero-sum games are adopted to allow
the transmitters to nd an operating point that balances network performance and
fairness. In [114], game theory was used by multiple eavesdroppers to decide whether
to collude or not in a MISO wiretap channel. The authors in [115] modelled the
interaction between primary users and secondary users as a Stackelberg game in
which transmission power levels are the key to maximi sing data rates. From these
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studies, it can be shown that the ST can be utilised either as a relay to forward the
primary information or as a jammer to send jamming signal. The goal is to enhance
the primary secrecy rate and improve the secondary transmission rate.
2.2 Wireless Channel Model
Research studies into wireless communication systems demand background
information in dierent aspects of wireless channel models. The mobile wireless
channel can be dened as the variations of the channel strength over time and
over frequency. The variations of the channel can be classied roughly into two
classes. Firstly, large-scale fading, which yields due to the path loss of signal that
considered as function of distance and shadowing by large objects such as hills, and
it considers frequency independent. Secondly, small-scale fading which occurs due
to the constructive and destructive interference of the multiple signal paths between
the transmitter and receiver, and it considers frequency dependent.
2.2.1 The Wireless Channel as a Linear Time-Varying
System
In a wireless communication, the channel refers to the dynamic and unpredictable
characteristics of electromagnetic radiation which propagate from the transmitter
(Tx) to the receiver (Rx). In 2.1. The three main physical phenomenon that
occur when a signal is propagating in outdoor urban environments are reection,
diraction and scattering. The received signal at Rx can be written asX
i
ai(f; t)x(t  i(f; t)); (2.1)
where x(t) is the transmitted signal and ai(f; t) and i(f; t) are the overall
attenuation and propagation delay respectively at time t from the transmitter to
the receiver on path i. In practice the attenuations and the propagation delays are
usually slowly varying functions of frequency, therefore the received signal at Rx can
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be modied as X
i
ai(t)x(t  i(t)): (2.2)
Since the channel is linear, it can be described by the response h(; t) at time t to an
Figure 2.1: Propagation of electromagnetic radiation
impulse transmitted at time t  . In terms of h(; t), the input-output relationship
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2.2 Wireless Channel Model
For a discrete time baseband model, it is assumed that the input waveform is
bandlimited to W. According to the sampling theorem, any waveform bandlimited
to W=2 can be expanded in terms of the orthogonal basis sinc(Wt  n)n, with
coecients given by the samples (taken uniformly at integer multiples of 1=W ),




abi(m=W )sinc(l   i(m=W )W ); (2.7)
where abi is the gain of path ,l is the tap can be interpreted as samples of the low-pass
ltered baseband channel response and m is an integer.
2.2.2 Fast and Slow Fading
One of the most important channel parameters is the time-scale of the variation of
the channel. How fast do the taps change as a function of time? From the following




abi(m=W )sinc(l   i(m=W )W ) (2.8)X
i
ai(m=W ) exp( j2fci(m=W ))sinc(l   i(m=W )W ) (2.9)
The baseband output is the sum of the delayed replicas of the baseband input over
each path. The phase is changed by =2 (i.e., is changed signicantly) when the
delay on the path changes by 1=(4fc), or equivalently, when the path length changes
by a quarter wavelength, i.e., by c=(4fc). If the path length is changing at velocity
v, the time required for such a phase change is c=(4fcv) where doppler shift (D)
at frequency fc is fcv=c. When the dierent paths contributing to the l
th tap have
dierent Doppler shifts, the magnitude of hl[m] changes signicantly with time-scale
inversely proportional to the maximum dierence between the Doppler shifts. This
maximum dierence is called the Doppler spread(Ds) and it can be represented as
Ds = max
n;k
fc j 0n(t)   0k(t)j ; (2.10)
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where  0n and 
0
k are Doppler shifts at paths n and k respectively. The coherence time
(Tc) of a wireless channel is the interval over which the channel impulse response





In wireless communication literature, a channel is classied as fast fading if Tc is
much shorter than the delay requirement of the application, and slow fading if Tc
is longer.
2.3 Secrecy rate and outage probability
In [69], Shannon put forward a novel conception of information-theoretic security.
This model assumed that a private key, K, is used to encrypt the condential
message, M, to yield the cipher, C, which is then transmitted over a noiseless
channel. Shannon assumed that the eavesdropper has unbounded computational
power, knowledge of the coding scheme sent by the legal transmitter, and access
to an identical copy of the received signal at the legal receiver. The formulation of
perfect secrecy was dened by requiring that, after a cryptography is intercepted by
the eavesdropper, the a posteriori probabilities of this cipher representing various
messages are identically equal to the a priori probabilities of the same messages
before the interception. In other words, perfect security requires
I(M;C) = 0;
where I(:; :) is the mutual information. Furthermore, it was shown that perfect
secrecy is possible but requires the number of condential messages to equal the
number of possible keys when the number of condential messages is nite. Based on
the Shannon information-theoretic security, Wyner proved the denition of secrecy
capacity [38]. In 6.2, the information signal , X is sent to Bob over the main
channel, which is modelled as a discrete memoryless channel. Alice receives Y, which
subsequently passes through an additional wiretap channel before being observed by
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the eavesdropper, Z. Wyner focused on maximising the transmission rate in the main
channel while cancelling the leakage of information to the wiretapper. In particular,
Alice has a condential message, W, which is uniformly distributed over 1, ..., 2nR,
where R is the rate of the legal link and n is the block length of this link. The
function of the legal transmitter is to send W reliably to the legitimate receiver
whilst keeping it secure from the eavesdropper. More specically, for every  > 0 it
is necessary that
Re    < 1
n
H(W jZn);
where H(W jZn) is entropy of W conditioned on Zn, for large n, where Re shows




is the amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper. A message, W, is
asymptotically perfectly secure from the eavesdropper [70] if
1
n
I(W ;Zn) < :
Recently, secrecy was studied in fading channels, including the use of outage
Figure 2.2: Illustration of wiretap channel
.
probability performance metrics. In physical layer security, outage metrics are
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presented equivalently to conventional rate outage metrics. For example, the secrecy
outage probability (PO) is the likelihood that the instantaneous secrecy rate (Rs) is
below a pre-determined threshold, , for a fading channel distribution [71]:
PO = Prob(Rs < ):
Furthermore, the authors in [72] proposed a specic scheme of the Wyner model
wherein the legal channel is noiseless and the wiretap channel is a binary symmetric
channel. They then analysed the capability of systematic linear codes for preserving
the secrecy of the transmitted message. In the case of the degraded wiretap channel
with additive Gaussian noise, and CM and CW as the Shannon capacities of the
legal and wiretap channels [39], the essential result for the secrecy capacity CS is
Cs = CM   CW :
2.4 Game theory models
Two major game-theoretic approaches can be used to model PHY security in CR:
 Non-cooperative games: Selsh players in non-cooperative games make
decisions independently. This does not mean that players do not cooperate,
but rather that any cooperation must be self-enforcing. The Nash equilibrium
is a well-known solution of non-cooperative game for selsh nodes. The Nash
equilibrium is achieved if every player faces a situation in which its present
strategy is optimal when other players do not change their strategies. The
Stackelberg game is dened as a strategic game in which a player acting as a
leader moves rst and the other players move afterward, acting as followers.
The Stackelberg game is a non-cooperative game and can be solved via a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
 Cooperative game: In a cooperative game, players have the ability to create
enforceable contracts. The players have a common objective of coalition,
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and cooperate to maximise this. In other words, players in a coalition can
coordinate strategies and agree on how the total payo is to be divided among
member players. A Nash bargaining game is used to solve cooperative games,
wherein the goal of the players is to maximise the product of their gains given
what they would gain without cooperation.
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Physical layer security in underlay
cognitive radio networks
The open nature of the wireless medium makes it susceptible to malicious
eavesdropping, and to counter this vulnerability, many recent studies have focused on
the cooperative jamming paradigm. The game-theoretic approach has been recently
considered as providing potential solutions for power control in the cognitive radio
network (CRN) underlayer. A critical issue in applying game theory is the selection
of its proper cost function. In this chapter, cooperative jamming is proposed to
enhance primary secrecy rate, and a new chaos-based cost function is introduced in
order to design a power control algorithm and analyse the dynamic spectrum-sharing
issue in the uplink of cellular CRNs. For secondary users as the game players
in underlay scenarios, utility/cost functions are dened, taking into account the
interference from and the interference tolerance of the primary users. A proof for
the existence of the Nash equilibrium in this power control game is presented, which
leads to signicantly lower power consumption and a relatively fast convergence
rate when compared to existing game algorithms. Simulation results indicate that
the primary secrecy rate is signicantly improved by cooperative jamming and the




In this chapter, a new scenario is proposed wherein the PU allows the SUs to access
its spectrum for better secrecy performance. It is assumed that the eavesdropper ED
can intercept the primary transmissions. It is moreover assumed that the SUs are
used as multi-antenna jammers for primary transmissions to create interference at
the ED. In such networks, a primary user may lease portions of a licensed spectrum
to a secondary user in exchange for enhancement of its security performance. This
scenario avoids the regulatory issues or monetary transactions that commonly hinder
the implementation of the property-rights spectrum leasing concept. Moreover, a
new game theory-based algorithm for power control is used to reduce interference
in the underlay CRNs. The contributions of this work are summarised as follows:
 A resource allocation scheme (i.e. power) is proposed for spectrum leasing to
maximise the primary secrecy rate with perfect knowledge of channel state
information (CSI).
 A novel and ecient cost function based on a chaotic logistic map is
proposed, which guarantees convergence of the `power ' game to a unique Nash
equilibrium.
 Power control is achieved with a signicant reduction in power consumption
for cognitive users (by at least half compared to other methods).
 It is also shown that the rate of convergence of the proposed chaotic algorithm
is relatively fast compared to existing iterative methods.
3.1.1 System model
In the system model (6.1), a CR spectrum-sharing network includes a set of N
cognitive SUs coexisting with the PUs, a primary base station (PBS) (serving the
PUs), and a secondary base station (SBS) (serving the cognitive network). Cognitive
users take advantage of the coexistence scenario to share spectrum resources with
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of an uplink CR system model with N SUs and 2 PUs
primary users. Let gi and hi denote the link gains from the cognitive user i to the
SBS and the PBS, respectively. It is proposed that the PUs, SUs, and the ED have
single antennae. In general, the secrecy rate Rsec is dened as:
Rsec = (RD  RE)+ (3.1)
where RD and RE are the information rates at the destination and eavesdropper,
respectively, and (x)+ = max(0; x) refers to the positivity value of the secrecy rate.
For convenience, the ()+ sign is omitted from subsequent calculations. Two phases
are proposed:
1) Phase 1 : The cognitive SBS can play the role of a multiple-antenna jammer
with N antennas when N SUs send a jamming signal through the SBS. The received





Pshspvz + nP ; (3.2)
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where s is the primary message signal from the PU with transmission power Pp, z is
the jamming signal, v is the pre coding weighting vector for z, Ps is the secondary
power, hpp  N (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the PU and PBS, hsp 
N (0N ; d s;p IN) is the channel vector between the SBS and PU (of length N due to N
multiple transmit antennas at the SBS), nP  N (0; 2),  is the pass loss exponent,






Pshsevz + nED; (3.3)
where hpe  N (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the PBS and ED, hse 
N (0K ; d S;EIK) is the channel vector between the SBS and the ED, and the distance
between them is dS;E. The information rate at PU is then
RP = log2




Simultaneously, the leakage rate at the ED is
RED = log2




According to (C.3), the achievable primary secrecy rate (PSR), denoted by RS; can
be obtained as follows:
RSEC = RP  RED
= log2









2) Phase 2 : The N cognitive SUs communicate through the SBS with limited
transmitted power to reduce interference with primary transmissions. The received













j + ns;i; (3.7)
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where s0i and z
0
j are the secondary signal with transmitted power pi and pj,
respectively, hps;i  N (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the PU and the
ith SU, gi  N (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the ith SU and the SBS,
qi  N (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the ith SU and jth SU, and





j=1;i 6=j pj jqi;jj2 + i + 2
!
; (3.8)
where i is the interference power from the PUs aecting the ith SU signal at the
SBS.
3.2 Phase I: Enhancing the primary secrecy rate
It is assumed that the SU and PU have global instantaneous CSI information and
that the SBS has knowledge of the CSI to the ED when the ED is active. A power
weight vector can be designed for the SBS to maximize the interference with the ED,
while minimising the interference with the PU. The solution of the weight vector for





jv (v)y j = 1:
Using projection matrix theory to provide the solution of optimisation problem in
(C.4),
v0j  can be achieved as follows:
jvj = (I  hsp(hsphsp
y) 1hsp
y)hse(I  hsp(hsphspy) 1hspy)h(se) ; (3.10)
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3.3 Phase II: The power control
Game theory, a strong tool in economics, can also be applied to solve the problem of
power control in wireless communication systems [1]. Based on a suitable utility or
cost function, the game solution can help to obtain power control policies through
eective iterative algorithms In this section, as several SUs will interfere with the
PUs to a certain degree, the goal of power control is to limit the power of the SUs
and thereby avoid excessive interference. One of the design goals for power control
in wireless networks is to ensure that no mobile's SINR falls below its threshold
tar, to ensure adequate QoS. In this section, a at fading channel is assumed, with
channel gains remaining quasi-static over time. It is assumed that CSI knowledge
between the PUs and the SUs is present. The SINR of the ith SU signal received at
the SBS is dened as
i =
pigiP





i > tar 8i; (3.13)
and 2i is the background noise, i is the interference power from the PUs aecting
the ith SU signal at the SBS, pi is the power level of the ith SU, and qi;j = gji;j:
Here, i;j denotes the correlation between the ith SU's signal and the jth SU's signal.
Thus, qij can be seen as an eective link gain from the jth user to the SBS when
considering its interference with the ith SU's signal.




pihi  Tmax; (3.14)
where Tmax is the interference tolerance of PUs. However, a cognitive user should
reach the minimum required SINR once the network allows it to communicate.
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3.3.1 Game theory and problem formulation
To enhance the communication eect, a cognitive user must increase its SINR,
which will frequently require high power. However, lower power is useful to decrease
interference with other SUs. Therefore, low power and high SINR contradict each
other. To resolve the conict and maximise the benet of SUs, game theory is
applied. Under the assumption that every SU is rational and wants to maximise
its benet, this problem is converted to a non-cooperative game problem. In this
section, the SINR-based power control problem is formulated as a non-cooperative
game by choosing an appropriate cost function and nding the corresponding Nash
equilibrium power vector. The power control game is dened as: G = [N ; P; J ],
where now N is the set of N players (SUs), P is the strategy (power) set for the
SUs, and J is the set of cost functions. The cost function of the ith SU is denoted
by J(pi; i(p)), where p = [p1; p2;    ; pN ] [3]. The generalised Nash equilibrium
problem|in which each player selshly optimises his own well-being within his
strategy set, which also depends on the strategies of the other players|is dened
as:




pihi  Tmax; (3.15b)
i(p) > tar: (3.15c)
The corresponding Nash equilibrium strategy is represented by the power vector
p = [p1; p

2;    ; pN ]; where pi is the Nash power, with the property that no
individual user can lower its cost by deviating from pi ; i.e,
J(pi ; i(p
))  J(pi; i(pi ): (3.16)




2;    ; pi 1; pi; pi+1;    ; pN ]: Every player (i.e., cognitive user) faces
a situation in which its present strategy is optimal when other players do not change
their strategies; that is, the game achieves the Nash equilibrium. Thus, our power
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control algorithm will search for the Nash equilibrium point (i.e., transmitting power
level) to maximise the user's utility (i.e., the rate of transmission of information).
Note that there are two conicting objectives. Generally, a higher SINR is targeted
for better service. However, a higher SINR is achieved at the cost of increased drain
on the battery and higher interference with signals of other users. Therefore, a cost
function is dened for each user depending on both power and SINR. In particular,
the cost of the dierence between the actual SINR and the target SINR, which is
chosen based on the estimated frame error rate, is considered. In order to ensure
non-negativity and convexity of the cost function (i.e., to allow the existence of a
non-negative minimum), the squared SINR error term is used. Furthermore, the
basic idea of chaotic optimisation is to map the chaotic variable onto an optimised
variable space, and then search for the global optimum using the ergodicity of its
chaotic movement [4]. Hence, the chaotic variable is included in the cost function
to reduce power consumption to an acceptable level. Based on the SINR constraint
in Equation (3.13), the following cost function is constructed:
J(pi; i) = ap
2
i + 2tar;ii + c(tar   i)2; (3.17)
where a and c are constants; tar;i is an acceptable error level of the target SINR,
which is controlled by a chaotic variable to allow a trade-o between pi and i. For
any non-negative a and c, J(pi; i) is a convex function with respect to pi. Therefore,
Nash equilibrium for our power control problem always exists. In order to derive this




= 2api + 2tar;i
gi
Ii





i6=j pjqij + i + i. Substituting Ii=gi = pi=i yields
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Equation (3.19) can be used to obtain pi through iterations as follows:
p
(l+1)

















where superscript ()(l) denotes the lth iteration and (l)tar;i is updated by a logistic







i (1  ch(l)i ); (3.21)

(l+1)
tar;i = (tar   tar)ch(l+1)i : (3.22)
Here,  is a parameter with a value close to 1 ( 2 [0:97; 0:99] is chosen in this design,
i.e., a drift of 1% to 3% from the target SINR tar is acceptable), while the initial
ch
(0)
i has a value chosen in [0, 1].
3.3.2 Convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium
Because a Nash equilibrium is a xed point of the best response functions, the
existence of at least one Nash equilibrium point is guaranteed by a proper choice for





exists, and if the function f satises three properties|positivity, monotonicity,
and scalability|then the power control algorithm will converge to a unique Nash
equilibrium. In the following, it will be proved here that these three properties are
satised in our proposed algorithm:
1) Positivity: f(pi) > 0. This is easily obtained from Equation (3.20) based on
the fact that a=c  1 can be chosen and the fact that tar  tar;i, as seen from
Equation (3.22).
2) Monotonicity: pi > p
0
i then f(pi) > f(p
0
i). To prove this property, the term
fi(p)  fi(p0) is considered, which is equal to
tar  tar;i
gi





i   p0iI 0i2):
Since pi > p
0
i, it holds that Ii > I
0
i. Also, it has been assumed that a=c  1, and
hence a=(cg2i ) (tar  tar;i)=gi. Thus, fi(pi)  fi(p0i) has a positive value.
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3) Scalability: f(pi) < f(pi) 8  > 1: If this condition is satised, the
algorithm converges to a unique xed point. From Equation (3.20), it can be found
that




(3   ): (3.23)
It is evident from Equation (4.6) that the scalability condition is satised due to
 > 1.
Positivity and monotonicity of f(pi) impose constraints on acceptable values
of Ii, but scalability restricts the noise power level allowed for the receiver and
generates a limit less than that required for monotonicity.
3.3.3 Iterative chaos-based power control algorithm
The procedure for applying a chaotic iterative algorithm for power control is as
follows:
1. Step 1 : Set the target SINR, tar, and the interference tolerance of PUs, Tmax.
Also, obtain the channel matrix with coecients gi and qij: Set the initial
value ch
(0)
i in [0,1]. Set l = 0:




tar;i by using Equation (3.21)
and Equation (3.22), respectively.
3. Step 3 : Apply Equation (3.20) to calculate p
(l)
i and then compute SINR (
(l)
i )
according to Equation (1).
4. Step 4 : If 
(l)














3.4 Results and discussion
In this section, the following two cases are used to highlight the eect of the jammer
and interference on the secrecy rate and quality of service, respectively, in cognitive
radio:
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i) Case I: Primary secrecy rate. In this case, the locations of the two
PUs, PBS, and SBS are xed at the coordinates (0,0.3), (0,0.5), (0,1), and (0,0),
respectively. To highlight the eect of eavesdropper position on the secrecy rate, two
schemes are considered depending on locations of eavesdropper as follows: Location
I (0,0.5), Location II (0,1.3) and Location III (1.2,0). It is assumed that the path
loss model h = d  is used with path loss exponent  = 3:0. Distances are in units
of Km.
Figure 3.2: Secrecy rate vs. jamming power
Figure 4.13 shows the eect of the jamming power of SUs on the primary
secrecy rate with regard to position of the eavesdropper. The secrecy rate increases
signicantly with jamming power due to the increase of interference with the
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eavesdropper and the orthogonality in Equation (C.5). It can also be concluded
that the secrecy rate is increased when the eavesdropper is located farther from the
legitimate transmitter, due to the decrease of hpe:
Figure 3.3: Secrecy rate vs. number of SUs
Figure 3.3 plots the eect of the number of SUs on the primary secrecy rate
with regard to position of eavesdropper. The secrecy rate increases signicantly
with the number of SUs, due to the increasing interference with the eavesdropper.
i) Case II: Interference in an underlay cognitive radio network . In
this study, three dierent underlay scenarios are considered to study the eects of
interference of PUs on the cognitive users while the interference tolerance of PUs is
preserved (all three scenarios use 2 PUs): i) Scenario 1: three SUs; ii) Scenario 2:
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five SUs; and iii) Scenario 3: ten SUs. The channel coecient matrix, G, for each
scenario is generated based on the on the locations of the PUs and SUs with respect
to the base stations and the cross correlation between user signals. In particular,
the channel gain, gi, is generated by the attenuation model gi = A=d
n, where d is
the distance between the user and the base station, which is uniformly randomly
generated. Here, fA; ng = f10 4; 3:5g for Scenario 2 and f10 8; 4g for Scenario 3.
However, in Scenario 1, the same xed-channel model as in [3] is used for comparison







A comparison is carried out between the proposed system with existing algorithms.
These are the revised Nash algorithm [1,5] (see (3.25)), power balancing by Koskie
and Gajic (KG) [3] (see Equation (3.26)), and the revised KG [7, 9] (see Equation























































respectively, with a=c = 0:25 for all algorithms. As the KG and revised KG
algorithms are similar approaches, only the results of the revised KG algorithm
are displayed here. The system parameters are set as follows: tar = 5 in both
scenarios; Tmax = 35mW;  = 0:99 for Scenario 1, and Tmax = 3:5mW;  = 0:98 for
Scenarios 2 and 3.
Figure 3.4 shows the comparison of average power consumption across 3 SUs in
Scenario 1. It is clear that the power consumption of the proposed algorithm is less
than that of the revised KG algorithm and particularly the revised Nash algorithm.
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In addition, the proposed algorithm converges near 55 iterations, much faster than
the revised KG algorithm (after 450 iterations) and only slightly slower than the
revised Nash algorithm (after 15 iterations). Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the same





























Scenario 1 (3 users)
 
 
proposed chaos based algorithm
revised Nash
revised KG
Figure 3.4: Average power consumption in Scenario 1
performance behaviour with more cognitive users (5 SUs and 10 SUs, respectively)
in Scenarios 2 and 3. However, in these scenarios, the convergence rate tends to be
faster for all algorithms when more users are involved.
As the proposed algorithm is applied in an underlay scenario, it is necessary to
study the eect of variation in the interference between PUs and SUs. Figure 3.7
shows the impact of the interference from the PUs on the average SINR across the
cognitive users. When the interference level increases, it is expected that the SINR
will be reduced. However, the SINR of the proposed chaos-based algorithm changes
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Scenario 2 (5 users)
 
 
proposed chaos based algorithm
revised Nash
revised KG
Figure 3.5: Average power consumption in Scenario 2
more slowly (that is, it remains almost stable under the changing interference
environment) compared with the other two algorithms. In addition, although the
SINR of the proposed algorithm is slightly smaller than that of the revised KG
algorithm, it is generally signicantly better than the revised Nash approach.
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proposed chaos based algorithm
Figure 3.6: Average power consumption in Scenario 3
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In this chapter, cooperative jamming has been proposed to maximise the primary
secrecy rate and achieve a sustainable secondary quality of service in underlay
CRNS. A novel chaotic cost function for power control, based on a non-cooperative
game among SUs, has been proposed for CRNs. A resultant Nash equilibrium
has been achieved and shown to be unique in the coexistence scenario of PUs
and SUs in CR systems. The simulation results indicate that the achievable
primary secrecy rate is signicantly enhanced by our cooperative jamming algorithm.
In addition, the numerical results show that the proposed algorithm achieves
lowest power consumption at the expense of a small drift (1-3%) from the target




Physical layer security in cognitive
radio networks via chaotic OFDM
Cognitive radio (CR) holds enormous potential for improving spectral utilisation,
making it important and challenging to design a CR network with an adaptive
access system and address its physical layer security issues. Secondary transmitters
usually transmit over multiple non-contiguous frequency holes, and hence a
multicarrier-based system is one of the best candidates for CR networks design.
This chapter proposes an integrated scheme with chaotic scrambling (CS), chaotic
articial noise, and a chaotic shift keying (CSK) scheme in an orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM)-based CR system to enhance its physical layer
security. By employing the chaos-based third-order Chebyshev map to achieve
the optimum bit error rate (BER) performance of CSK modulation, the proposed
three-layer integrated scheme outperforms the traditional OFDM system in an
overlay scenario with a Rayleigh fading channel. Importantly, under three layers
of encryption that is based on chaotic scrambling, chaotic articial noise, and CSK
modulation, a large key size can be generated to resist brute-force attacks and




In this chapter, a security mechanism for OFDM-based CR networks. This
mechanism provides extreme sensitivity to initial conditions in generating the chaotic
sequence. A slight dierence in the initial condition of the chaotic sequences between
transmitter and receiver results in an almost completely dierent position matrix,
leading to failure in decrypting the data signal and thereby guaranteeing the security
of the system. The Chebyshev map is selected to generate a chaotic reference
sequence in CSK, as this map satises the necessary conditions for optimum BER
in this proposed chaotic OFDM (C-OFDM) scheme. The feasibility of employing
three layers of security is investigated as follows:
1. Layer 1 : The constellation symbols are dynamically scrambled using a
scrambling matrix, which is generated based on the mixing property of the
chaotic dynamical systems (using a chaos-based logistic map).
2. Layer 2 : The third-order Chebyshev map is used to perform CSK modulation,
which allows spreading of each frame of the scrambled data with a specic
initial condition.
3. Layer 3 : This is introduced by adding chaotic articial noise to enhance the
secrecy rate.
Our contributions are the following:
1. Three-layer protection is proposed for CR networks. The rst and second
layers provide protection against brute-force attacks, while the third layer
provides protection against eavesdroppers.
2. The secrecy rate and the power allocation of the proposed C-OFDM CR
networks are optimised under dierent scenarios for eavesdroppers.
(a) Scenario I { Single eavesdropper: An ecient optimisation scheme is
provided to maximise the secondary secrecy rate (SSR) under the at
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fading channel model. Subsequently, the secondary power optimisation
allocation problem is analysed and solved at the secondary transmitter
(ST).
(b) Scenario II { Multiple eavesdroppers: Analysis is provided for
the proposed CR systems under the malicious attempt of multiple
non-colluding eavesdroppers that are distributed according to a
homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) distribution around secondary
transceivers. This is to highlight the impact of multiple eavesdroppers
on the primary secrecy rate (PSR) and SSR. It is shown that the secrecy
outage probability and the mean secrecy rate achieved for CR systems
under the non-colluding eavesdroppers are signicantly lower than under
traditional transceivers without articial noise.
4.2 System model and architecture of security
layers
The proposed CR network architecture is shown in Figure 4.1 with two primary
users, two secondary (unlicensed) users, and a primary (licensed) base-station.
The primary users have a license to operate in a certain spectrum band, whilst
the primary base-station is a xed infrastructure network component, which has a
spectrum license, such as base-station transceiver system (BTS) in a cellular system.
To improve physical layer security in CR networks, three layers of security
are proposed, which are applied to each frame of plain data (Figure 4.2) utilising
chaotic scrambling, chaotic modulation, and articial noise. The rst and second
layers are important for improving physical security against brute force attacks,
while the third layer is useful to enhance secrecy rates against eavesdroppers. The
goal of jamming the signal/articial noise is to create confusion at the eavesdroppers
in order to reduce their information rate. Notice that the legitimate receiver has a
priori knowledge of the jamming signal sent by the source. This can be implemented
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Figure 4.1: Cognitive radio architecture
in practice with a small amount of overhead. For example, the jamming signal can be
Gaussian noise generated by a chaotic pseudo-random generator with nite states,
and the trusted nodes maintain the same pseudo-random generator. Only the state
of the pseudo-random generator needs to be sent to the destination via a separate
and secure control channel. In this way, the legitimate receivers have complete
knowledge of the jamming signals.
4.2.1 Transmitter
OFDM-CSK with a discrete chaotic sequence for modulation is considered in
the system, with respect to the non-coherent advantages of DCSK and the
spectral eciency of multi-carrier modulation. For mathematical simplication, a
mathematical model is described for a single user only. As shown in Figure 4.3, for
each user, a chaotic code is generated and used as a reference and spreading code.
The input information sequence is rst converted into U parallel data sequences
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Figure 4.2: Three layers of security
with each bit being of equal probability of +1 and -1.
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of the OFDM-CSK transmitter
Let S be the U  U scrambling matrix, which is obtained by the logistic
map-based chaotic sequence xc, generated from the chaotic signal generator. Also
let s = [s1; s2;    ; sU ]T and e = [e1; e2;    ; eU ]T represent the data vectors before
and after scrambling (the rst layer of security), respectively. It holds that
e = s S: (4.1)
The uth sub-stream is spread with the chaotic spreading code au =
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where h(t) is the square-root-raised-cosine lter, is the length of chaotic spreading
code and Tc is the chip duration. This lter is band-limited and is normalised to
have unit energy. Let H(f) = F (h(t)), where F denotes the Fourier transform.
It is assumed that H(f) is limited to [ Bc=2; Bc=2] ; which satises the Nyquist
criterion with a roll-o factor  (0 <  < 1): Here, Bc = (1 + )=Tc. Note that the
rst two subcarriers are used to modulate the reference signals xu(t) and xc(t). The
remaining subcarriers are used to carry data. Therefore, the transmitted signal of
the single-user OFDM-CSK after the second layer of security is given by





where 'i represents the phase angle introduced in the carrier modulation process
of the ith subcarrier (with frequency fi). In this chapter the transmitted energy in
every subcarrier is normalised.
4.2.2 Receiver
The OFDM-CSK receiver is illustrated as a block diagram in Figure 4.4. A set of
correlators is considered, each demodulating the desired signal of the corresponding
carrier frequency fi: The signals are then sampled every kTc seconds. Assuming that
perfect symbol and carrier synchronisation of the OFDM is realised at the receiver,
it is assumed that our channel exhibits additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). In
addition, it is assumed that there is no interference between subcarriers. In this
case, the received signal is evaluated for one user [15, 16]. After removing articial
noise and cyclic extension, the received signal can be written as
r(t) = e(t) + n(t); (4.4)
where n(t) is AWGN noise with zero mean and power spectral density of N0=2 plus
interference from other secondary users. After applying a fast Fourier transform
(FFT) on the received signal, the output at the ith subcarrier (removing the time
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Figure 4.4: Block diagram of the OFDM-CSK receiver
index, t, for notational convenience) is given by
ri = yi + ni; (4.5)
where yi = eixu and ni is the additive white Gaussian noise. The output of each







x2u;k + vi; (4.6)




[xuvk;i + e ix uxu]; (4.7)
where e ix u represents interference from other secondary users. An equal gain is






where H' is the transfer function of the channel, (?) represents the conjugation
relation and jH'j is the amplitude of transfer function. This equalisation method
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corrects for the phase shift due to the channel. The information bit ai of the ith
correlation detector can be recovered after equalisation as
ai = sign(di): (4.9)
A descrambling process is then applied with the same initial condition as for the
transmitter to ai to detect the transmitted bits.
4.2.3 Design of chaotic scrambling and CSK modulation
Enhancing the physical layer security is an important goal of our proposed system.
As shown later in Equation (4.17), the chaotic map parameter and initial condition of
the chaotic sequence have a considerable impact on the overall BER. Therefore, two
layers of encryption are proposed by combining chaotic modulation and scrambling
to improve the diusion property of the encrypted data. The scrambling matrix
represents the rst layer of encryption and is generated by the following algorithm.
A new position matrix P of the same size U U as in (1) is generated, wherein the
position elements signify the location of 1 in the scrambling matrix S. The design
methodology of the position matrix is based upon the mixing property of chaotic
dynamical systems. The mixing property is dened in the following way [17]: For
any two open intervals I and J (which can be arbitrarily small, but must have a
nonzero length), one can nd initial values in I which, when iterated, will eventually
lead to points in J . Each sub-domain chaotic map is sequentially numbered from 0 to
U 1. In the scrambling matrix design, each row has one `1', the remaining elements
are zero, and no two rows are the same. For each scrambling matrix, a new key is
used, with each key specifying a mapping to a unique combination. The matrix,
when multiplied with constellation symbols, scrambles the position of the elements.
It is dicult to recover the data with a dierent key. Due to the characteristics
of CR, such as a wireless LAN, attackers can store and read all the trac of the
CR. Consequently, chaotic scrambling is useful to provide each encrypted frame
with a specic initial condition. Let the scrambled version of the rst frame e1
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with length U be denoted by c1 = CS(e1; xc(C1)); where CS denotes the chaotic
scrambling process described above, xc() is the logistic chaotic function, and C1 is
initial condition of the chaotic map for the rst frame. In general, for the nth frame,
it holds that
cn = CS(en; xc(Cn)); (4.10)
in which xc(Cn) can be written as
xc(Cn) =   xc(Cn 1)(1  xc(Cn 1)); (4.11)
where 3:75    4; and xc(Cn) is the current state of the chaotic map while
xc(Cn 1) is its previous state. Note that xc(Cn) has a value between [0, 1].
The second layer of encryption is represented by CSK modulation, which
provides random sequences of samples that modulate and spread each frame of the
output scrambled data, cn, with a specic initial condition according to the formula
un = CSK(cn; xu(Cn)); (4.12)
where CSK is the chaotic shift keying modulating function, and xu() is the
third-order Chebyshev map function, as this map satises the necessary conditions
of the optimum BER, which is shown later in the next section. In our proposed








where the current state of chaotic signal, xu(Cn) = gn(cos), depends upon the
previous state, xu(Cn 1), of the chaotic map. Note that xu(Cn 1) = gn 1(cos) and
c1 = 4 and c2 = 3 are the chosen chaotic map parameters in this work, while xu()
has values between [-1, 1]. The characteristic of the third-order Chebyshev map
of chaos is shown in Figure 5.14. The malicious eavesdropper must have the same
initial condition and chaotic map parameters to be able to decrypt the data.
49
4.3 Analysis of BER performance
Figure 4.5: Characteristic of the third-order Chebyshev map
4.3 Analysis of BER performance
In this section, analytical expressions are derived for the bit error rate (BER)
of an OFDM-based CSK scheme. Here the analysis for the discrete-time case is
presented. By applying a Gaussian approximation and the central limit theorem,
approximate analytical expressions are obtained for the BER for suciently large
spreading factors. It can be seen that all sum items in Equation (4.6) can be
regarded as zero-mean Gaussian random variables. Hence, the decision parameter














where N is the number of secondary users, and dj and xu;j are the transmitted
data and spreading sequence of other secondary users, respectively. From an
independence feature between chaotic sequences, both cov[x2u;i; x
2
u;j] and E [xu;i; xu;j]
must be equal to zero. Under this assumption, the variance of yi can be formulated
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as









where E [:] represents the expectation operator, N0=2 is the power spectral density of
Gaussian noise, and var [:] denotes the variance operator. Each correlation detection
output, Ui, can be regarded as an independent Gaussian variable for large . Thus,



















s ; Ps = E[x
2
u;i], and  must be
same for all users. However, the above BER is achieved only if the chaotic map
satises the following conditions [18]:
c1) Dierent users have chaotic sequences with very low cross-correlations even for
a nite length; that is, cov[x2k; x
2
m] = 0, where xk and xm are dierent chaotic
sequences.
c2) The bit energy is kept constant for each user.
c3) E[xk; xm] = 0.
In the following, it will be shown that the chaos-based Chebychev map satises these
three conditions. In general, for the Chebyshev map of degree N , it is the case that
gkN(cos') = cos(N
k'): (4.18)
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Considering the case where k 6= m. Without a loss of generality, it can be














































Combining Equation (4.20), (4.22), and (4.23) yields cov [x2k; x
2
m] = 0.
 Proof of condition (c3): With k 6= m and some positive integer n, and replacing










cos' (gnm(cos')) d' = 0:
4.4 Enhancing secrecy using chaotic articial
noise
In this section, the objective is to improve the secondary secrecy rate via
transmitting appropriate jamming signals, as the eavesdropper may intercept the
reference chaotic signals at frequencies f1 and f2. There is no extra jammer,
but a-priori knowledge of jamming signals is available at legitimate receivers.
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To enhance secrecy, the legitimate transmitters are allowed to use some of their
power to transmit a jamming signal, in addition to transmitting the message signal.
According to the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels addressed in [25], it has been
shown that for input s, the secrecy capacity, Csec, is given by
Csec = max
s






where x and xE are the received signals in legitimate and eavesdropper receivers,
respectively. Here it is considered that any pair of mutual information
(I(s; x); I(s; xE)) for messages x and xE is said to be achievable if the average error
probabilities Pe;1 = Pr(x^ 6= x) and Pe;2 = Pr(x^E 6= xE) can be made arbitrary small.






= max(RD  RE)+; (4.25)
where RD is the information rate at the destination and RE is the leakage rate at
the eavesdropper; and (x)+ = max(0; x) refers to the positivity value of the secrecy
rate. For convenience, the ()+ sign from is removed from subsequent calculations.





(1  )Pshssz + nR + nI ; (4.26)
where u is the transmitted signal at the output of Layer 3; Ps is the transmission
power;  is the power fraction used to transmit data (0 <  < 1); hss  CN (0; 2h)
comprises the channel coecients between the secondary transmitter and receiver;
nR  CN (0; 2) is the AWGN at the secondary receiver and nI an interference from
other secondary users; and z is an articial noise generated by a linear feedback
shift register (FSR), which is controlled by chaotic signal-based Chebyshev map




z = Q(xu(Cn)); (4.28)
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where Q() is a 3-bit quantiser function. According to conditions (c1) and (c3) in
Section III, and using a Chebyshev map as the chaotic sequence in Layers 2 and 3 of
the C-OFDM transmitter, nI can be neglected due to zero cross-correlation between






It is assumed that the ST is aware of articial noise. The rate at the secondary




log(1 + ss): (4.29)





(1  )Pshsez + nE; (4.30)
where nE  CN (0; 2) and hse  CN (0; 2h) is the channel between the secondary













According to Eq. (4.25), the achievable secrecy rate, Rsec, can be calculated as
Rsec = Rss  Rse (4.32)
Rsec = log2(1 + ss)  log2(
(1 + se)
(1 + (1  )se)): (4.33)
4.4.1 Optimisation of the secrecy rate
The secondary transmitter can optimise  to maximise the secrecy rate. First, the
following property holds:
Lemma 1. The secrecy rate of secondary transmission in Eq. (4.33) is concave in
terms of .
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Proof: See Appendix A
As the secrecy rate is concave in terms of , it is possible to nd the optimum













ss   se + ssse
2ssse
: (4.35)
Therefore, the optimum solution that maximises Rsec is given by
 = argmaxRsec(): (4.36)
4.5 Extension to multiple eavesdroppers
In this case, all the eavesdroppers are distributed on a two-dimensional plane
according to a homogeneous (PPP) distribution e with density e around N
ST-SR pairs. This means that eavesdroppers are distributed randomly with dierent
distances around legitimate STs, as shown in Figure 5.12. As a worst-security case,
it is assumed that each eavesdropper is similar to a legal receiver, which can cancel
the interference caused by other (N   1) STs due to low cross-correlation between
secondary users. This assumption is useful to highlight the eect of interference
caused by the chaotic articial noise. Furthermore, equal transmission power is
assumed amongst the STs (i.e., Ps;k = Ps=N) and E[jhsej2] = 1: In this scenario,
two important performance metrics are considered: secrecy outage probability and
mean secrecy rate.
4.5.1 Secrecy outage probability of multiple eavesdroppers
The signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of any particular eavesdropper
(with distance de;k to the considered kth ST) is given by
e;k =
Ps;k jhsej2
2de;k + (1  )Ps;k jhsej2
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of eavesdroppers around ST-SR pairs
=
Ps jhsej2
2de;kN + (1  )Ps jhsej2
: (4.37)
The outage probability is dened as the probability that any eavesdropper has an
SINR greater than or equal to the SINR of the legitimate destination, denoted by
k where k = 1; 2; :::; N . The special case of the most malicious eavesdropper to the




2de;kN + (1  )Ps jhsej2
: (4.38)
Lemma 2. The secrecy outage probability between the kth SR and the most malicious
eavesdropper is written as
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Proof: See Appendix B.
The following presents the special case in which the path loss exponent is equal
to 4, which is commonly used for practical scenarios of large-scale wireless networks
[33,34].
Lemma 3. With the path loss exponent equal to 4, the secrecy outage probability






















Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 1. The following observations can be seen from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3:
1. The secrecy outage probability approaches 0 as N goes to innity.
2. The secrecy outage probability is decreased signicantly when the allocated
power Ps(1  ) for articial noise is increased.
3. The ratio between the allocated power for the signal and articial noise is
limited by 
(1 )  k according to Equations (4.39) and (4.40).
4. The secrecy outage probability increases with increasing e.
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4.5.2 Mean secrecy rate
In this subsection, the mean secrecy rate, averaged over the random locations of
the eavesdroppers, is derived. The following result is obtained for the mean secrecy
rate at the kth SR when the interference between multiple ST-SR pairs is neglected
according to conditions (c1) and (c3) in Section III.
Lemma 4. The mean secrecy rate achievable at the kth SR by employing C-OFDM
and articial noise in CR systems is




fe0;k(x) log2(1 + x)dx;
where E;k and min are the SINR between the kth SR and the nearest eavesdropper







































Proof: See Appendix D.
Remark 2. The following observations arise from Lemma 4:
1. The mean secrecy rate increases signicantly as N goes to innity due to the
secrecy outage probability approaching 0.
2. The mean secrecy rate increases signicantly as  approaches 0 due to the
decreasing secrecy outage probability.
4.6 Simulation results and discussion
In the CR-based chaotic OFDM-CSK system, a Chebyshev map is used to generate
a chaotic sequence. The system is applied in spectrum overlay, or opportunistic
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spectrum access (OSA), wherein secondary users aim to exploit frequency bands that
are not used by primary users in a particular geographical area. In this scheme, there
are no power limits placed on secondary users because of the absence of interference
with primary users.
In a simulation, the following parameters are considered: 2 secondary users, 2
primary users, data rate = 10kbps, symbol period Tb = 100sec, spreading factor 
= 12/25/50, FFT length = 64, data subcarriers = 52, and a Rayleigh fading channel
with AWGN. The number of taps for the Rayleigh fading channel, in the comparison
between traditional and chaotic OFDM, is 10 in overlay spectrum access.
Figure 4.7 shows the BER performance of CR-based MC-CSK for dierent
lengths of spreading codes in the overlay scenario. The BER is improved by using
a longer spreading code according to Eq. (4.17).
Regarding the scrambling and CSK process, when the same data are recovered
with a slightly dierent initial condition for the chaos generator between transmitter
and receiver, nearly all of the constellation symbols are in error. The probability
of error is uniformly distributed in symbols. To test the eect of chaotic
scrambling/modulation, the proposed chaotic scrambling is applied in OFDM with
QPSK. It is assumed that the initial condition value for the chaotic map in the
legal receiver is 0:095, while the eavesdropper with the illegal receiver has an initial
condition value for the same chaotic map of 0:095000001.
The simulation results for the BER are shown in Figure 4.8. It is conrmed that
with the slightly dierence of 10 9 in the initial conditions between the legal and
illegal receivers, the illegal receiver yields a much higher BER by using the proposed
chaotic scrambling than by scrambling the sample sequence within each time-domain
OFDM symbol. This phenomenon is equivalent to a constellation transformation
over each subcarrier in the frequency domain [20]. Therefore, this result conrms
that enhancement in a low-data interception feature due to the proposed system
encrypts each frame with the specic initial condition of chaotic scrambling. Also,
it is dicult for a passive attacker to sni encrypted frames with dierent chaotic
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Figure 4.7: BER performance of the proposed system for dierent lengths of
spreading code in CR-based overlay spectrum access
initial conditions.
It is necessary to investigate the eect of a slight error in the parameter of the
chaotic map that generates the chaotic signal for CSK on BER performance of the
illegal C-OFDM-based receiver (with no error in scrambling process). Figure 4.9
shows that the illegal receiver still has a very high BER compared to that of the
legal C-OFDM receiver.
In the above scenarios, the chaotic scrambling and CSK modulation are
useful for generating a large key space to resist brute-force attacks and provide
a low-interception feature.
The eect of adding chaotic articial noise to Layer 3 to improve the secrecy
rate in two scenarios was investigated as follows:
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Figure 4.8: Eect of a slight error in the initial condition for chaotic scrambling on
the BER of the illegal receiver
i) Scenario I - Single eavesdropper : In this scenario, the location of the
legitimate transmitter is xed at the (0,0) coordinate to determine the eect of
eavesdropper position on the secrecy rate. Three schemes are considered depending
on the location of the single eavesdropper: Location I (0.6,0), Location II (1.0,0),
and Location III (1.2,0). It is assumed that that the path loss model h = d  is
used with path loss exponent  = 3:0.
Figure 4.10 represents the eect of distance between the legitimate transmitter
and receiver on the secrecy rate with respect to the position of the single
eavesdropper. The secrecy rate decreases signicantly with increasing distance due
to the decrease in ss in Eq. (4.33) between the source and destination. Moreover,
the secrecy rate is increased when the eavesdropper is located farther away from the
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Figure 4.9: Eect of a slight error in the parameters of chaotic modulation on the
performance of the illegal receiver
legitimate transmitter due to the decrease in se:
Figure 4.11 shows the eect of SNR on the secrecy rate with respect to
position of the single eavesdropper and the location of the legitimate receiver at the
coordinates of (0.5,0). It is evident from this gure that the secrecy rate increases
signicantly with increasing SNR.
Figure 4.12 shows the eect of the allocated power  on the secrecy rate with
respect to the position of the single eavesdropper with the legitimate receiver located
at the same coordinates of (0.5,0). This indicates that the secrecy rate is a concave
function with respect to , according to Eq. (4.35).
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Figure 4.10: Secrecy rate vs. distance between the legitimate transmitter and
receiver
Figure 4.13 shows that the optimal allocated power fraction, ; decreases with
increasing distance between the legitimate transmitter and receiver, according to
Eq. (4.36), due to the increased allocated power fraction of articial noise (1   )
for maintaining an acceptable secrecy rate when the legitimate transmitter is closer
to the eavesdropper than to the legitimate receiver. On the other hand,  increases
when the eavesdropper is located farther away, due to the decrease of se in Eq.
(4.35).
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Figure 4.11: Secrecy rate vs. SNR
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Figure 4.12: Secrecy rate vs. 
65
4.6 Simulation results and discussion
Figure 4.13: Optimal allocated power fraction () vs. distance between the
legitimate transmitter and receiver
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ii) Scenario II - Multiple eavesdroppers: This scenario considers the
secrecy outage probability and mean secrecy rate of a C-OFDM CR system with
multiple eavesdroppers. Here, it is assumed that e = 0:1; 
2 = 10 4, k =  1dB,
and min =  5dB. Figure 4.14 compares the secrecy outage probability of the
proposed system with chaotic articial noise (of various values of ) and without
articial noise. The secrecy outage probability decreases with an increasing number
of ST SR pairs. Moreover, the secrecy outage probability is reduced signicantly
by chaotic articial noise in comparison with no articial noise, and this is consistent
with our nding in Remark 1. Finally, the secrecy outage probability decreases with
decreasing , due to the increased power allocated to the chaotic articial noise.
Figure 4.14: Secrecy outage probability vs. number of ST-SR pairs
Figure 4.15 shows that the mean secrecy rate of multiple eavesdroppers increases
signicantly with the number of ST SR pairs, whereas it decreases signicantly with
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increasing , which is consistent with Remark 2.
Figure 4.15: Mean secrecy rate vs. number of ST-SR pairs
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter proposed the OFDM-CSK-based CR system with chaotic scrambling
and modulation. OFDM-CSK is a non-coherent system that, in contrast to the
traditional CSK, does not require reproduction of the chaotic signal at the receiver.
A mechanism was proposed to provide three layers of security. In the rst layer,
the constellation symbols are dynamically scrambled using a scrambling matrix
that is generated based on the chaos logistic map. In the second layer, the
Chebyshev map-based CSK allows for spreading of each frame of the scrambled
data with a specic initial condition and mapping parameters. In the third layer,
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chaotic articial noise was applied to enhance the secrecy rate against malicious
eavesdroppers. Our simulation results have shown that two security layers provide
a low-interception property and make it dicult for passive attackers to process
frames with dierent initial conditions or dierent values of the chaotic map
parameters. This feature provides a large key space for chaotic scrambling and
chaotic modulation to resist malicious attacks. Moreover, both the secrecy rate and




Enhancing physical layer security
via Stackelberg game theory
In this chapter, a game theory-based cooperation scheme is investigated to enhance
physical layer (PHY) security in both the primary and secondary transmissions of
a cognitive radio network (CRN). In CRNs, the primary network may decide to
lease its own spectrum for a fraction of time to the secondary nodes in exchange
for appropriate remuneration. The secondary transmitter (ST) is considered as a
trusted relay for primary transmission in the presence of the eavesdropper (ED) . The
ST forwards a message from the primary transmitter (PT) in a decode-and-forward
(DF) fashion and, at the same time, allows part of its available power to be
used to transmit an articial noise (i.e., jamming signal) to enhance secrecy rates.
Power is allocated between the message and jamming signals via formulation and
solution of the optimisation problem for maximising the primary secrecy rate
(PSR) and secondary secrecy rate (SSR) with malicious attempts from a single
eavesdropper or multiple eavesdroppers. The cooperation between the primary and
secondary transmitters is then analysed from a game-theoretic perspective, and
model their interaction as a Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg equilibrium is proven
theoretically and computed. Finally, numerical examples illustrate the impact of
the Stackelberg game-based optimisation on the achievable PSR and SSR. It will be
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shown that spectrum leasing, based on trading secondary access for cooperation by
means of relay and a jammer, is a promising framework for enhancing primary and
secondary secrecy rates in cognitive radio networks when the ED can intercept both
the primary and secondary transmission.
5.1 Part I: physical layer security via a
Stackelberg game
Inspired by [117], a novel scenario is proposed wherein the ED can intercept the
primary and secondary transmissions, and the ST acts as a trusted relay and
jammer by allocating part of its transmitted power to emit an articial noise,
creating interference to EDs and thereby protecting the primary and secondary
transmissions. The main benet of this novel scenario is its protection of both the
primary and secondary transmissions against eavesdroppers, in contrast to previous
studies, which protected only primary transmissions. It is assumed that the primary
receiver (PR) and SR have knowledge of articial noise, in order to overcome the
articial noise at a legal receiver. Two scenarios are studied in which a Stackelberg
game theory-based cooperative scheme is used to improve the achievable primary
secrecy rate (PSR) and secondary secrecy rate (SSR). In Scenario I, a single ED
is considered as shown in Figure 6.1. Here, the PT broadcasts its encoded signal
to the ST in Phase 1 under the assumption that the ED is out of range of the
PT; then, the ST forwards the primary message with articial noise to the PR in
Phase 2; and nally the ST sends its own signal with articial noise to the SR
in Phase 3. In Scenario II, as indicated in Figure 6.2, the work is extended to
multiple eavesdroppers which are located in the range of the ST. The SR is also
able to function as a multi-antenna jammer in Phase 1 to reduce the leakage rate at
the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, in Scenario II, the following two cases of multiple
eavesdroppers are considered in deriving the closed forms of the secrecy rates for
ST-PR and ST-SR transmissions:
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 Colluding eavesdroppers : All eavesdroppers can be seen as a single
eavesdropper due to their joint processing action, and the optimal receiver
strategy is based on maximum ratio combining, which combines the eects of
all eavesdroppers in deriving closed forms for the PSR and SSR [106].
 Non-colluding eavesdroppers : The secrecy rate is determined by that of the
most malicious eavesdropper, considering that each eavesdropper overhears
the primary or secondary communication individually.
Figure 5.1: Illustration of the cognitive radio (CR) system model in Scenario I
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the CR system model in Scenario II
In such networks, a primary node may lease portions of a licensed spectrum to
a secondary node in exchange for some form of compensation. Moreover, retribution
from secondary to primary nodes takes the form of cooperative relaying and jamming
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to enhance the secrecy of the primary transmission. This scenario avoids the
regulatory issues or money transactions that commonly hinder implementation of
the property-rights spectrum leasing concept [124].
In the context of the aforementioned schemes, novel system designs|power
allocation and time allocation|are proposed for primary and secondary
transmissions that maximise the achievable PSR and SSR subject to a total transmit
power constraint. Codeword design for meeting the achievable secrecy rates is not
considered in this work. The main contributions of this work can be summarised as
follows:
 In Scenario I, with a single eavesdropper, an ecient optimisation is provided
that maximises both the PSR and SSR under the at fading channel model.
In particular, the primary and secondary power allocation problems at the ST
are analysed and solved using time slot allocation of the spectrum lease.
 In Scenario I, the secrecy rates achieved with our proposed 3-phase system are
higher than those in other studies ([98],[99]), which are based on an external
jammer in the same geometric environment.
 Scenario II studies the design and analysis for the proposed CRNs under
malicious attempts by multiple eavesdroppers (colluding and non-colluding
eavesdroppers) around the ST to highlight the impact of multiple
eavesdroppers on the PSR and SSR. The power allocation problem and time
allocation problem are analysed and solved.
 In Scenario II, it is shown that the secrecy rate achieved for CRNs under the
colluding eavesdropper is signicantly lower than that under non-colluding
eavesdroppers.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section II, the system
model and achievable secrecy rates are dened in cognitive Scenario I. Section
III presents the possible optimisation problems for the given scenarios and their
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game-theoretic approach in Scenario II. Those scenarios are then compared through
numerical simulations in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes this chapter.
5.2 Enhancing secrecy rates using a Stackelberg
game: a single eavesdropper (Scenario I)
This section considers a cooperative CRN where the ST is allowed to access the
primary spectrum, provided that it acts as the jammer for the ED and the relay
for the primary transmission as illustrated in Figure 6.1, consisting of the following
single antenna nodes: a PT, a PR, a cognitive ST, an SR, and a single ED (i.e.,
Scenario I). It is assumed that the legal primary destination has a priori knowledge
of the jamming signal sent by the ST (relay), and the secondary destination has
a priori knowledge of the jamming signals sent by the ST. This is achieved by
communicating the legal source and destination in a two-step process. In the rst
step, the phase response of the channel is probed, and in the second step, the
information-bearing signal is modied to pre-compensate for the phase eects of the
channel. As the channels between the legal source and destination are completely
dierent from the channels between the legal source and eavesdroppers, this process
is secure [119],[120]. It is assumed that each node carries a single omnidirectional
antenna, the relaying strategy is decode-and-forward (DF), and global channel state
information (CSI) is available by a standard channel estimation (CE) technique; that
is, training-based CE (TBCE). In TBCE, the pilot symbols are used for acquiring
an estimated CSI prior to actual data transmission, and subsequently the channel
is estimated using the combined knowledge of the transmitted and received signals
[122] and [123]. To enhance the achievable secrecy rate, the ST allocates part of
its transmitting power to emit a jamming signal and the remainder to emitting the
information signal. Depending upon the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel in
[102], the secrecy capacity Csec for input s is given by
Csec = max
s









where x and xED are the signals received by the ST and ED, respectively. In this
chapter, any pair of mutual information (I(s; x); I(s; xED)) for messages x and xED
is considered to be achievable if the average error probabilities, Pe;1 = Pr(x^ 6= x)







= (RD  RE)+; (5.2)
where RD is the information rate at the destination and RE is the leakage rate at the
eavesdropper; and (x)+ = max(0; x) to guarantee that the value of the secrecy rate
is positive. For convenience, the ()+ sign is omitted from subsequent expressions.
5.2.1 Proposed cooperative CRNs
The system has three phases:
1) Phase 1 : The PT decides to allocate only a fraction (1 ) of the whole time
slot for transmission from the PT to the ST (where 0 <  < 1:). The remaining
fraction will be used in Phases 2 and 3. It is assumed that transmission from the
PT is invisible at the ED. The PT encodes a condential message into a n length






jskj2  PMAX ; (5.3)
where PMAX is the maximum primary power of the PT. In Phase I, the ST is used
as a relay and the received signal at the ST is
XST =
p
Pphpss+ nST ; (5.4)
where s is the primary message signal, Pp is the primary power level, nST 
CN (0; 2) is the noise at the ST, and hps  CN (0; 2h) is the channel coecient
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Then, the information rate at the ST, RPS; is obtained as
RPS = (1  ) log2(1 + ps): (5.5)
2) Phase 2 : The ST then forwards the secure primary message to the PR within
the fraction  (where 0 <  < 1) of the considered time slot. In this phase, for
security reasons, the ST also re-encodes the articial noise, z, using a faction (1  )
of the available power level, Ps (where 0 <  < 1). Furthermore, the ST encodes
a condential message into the n length block codeword from Phase 1, with the






js^kj2  Ps;MAX ; (5.6)
where Ps;MAX is the maximum secondary power of the ST. The received signal at












(1  )Pshsez + nED; (5.8)
where s^ is the re-encoded primary message signal, z  CN (0; 1) is the articial noise,
hsp  CN (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the ST and the PR, and hse 
CN (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the ST and the ED. After removing the
articial noise, the information rate at PR becomes







5.2 Enhancing secrecy rates using a Stackelberg game: a single
eavesdropper (Scenario I)
The information leakage at the ED in Phase 2 is then
R
(2)
SE =  log2(
(1 + se)






Then, the achievable PSR, denoted by Rpsec; can be written as
RPSEC = RSP  R(2)SE
= (log2(1 + sp) 
log2(
(1 + se)
(1 + (1  )se))): (5.11)
3) Phase 3 : The ST sends its own secure secondary message to the SR within
the remaining fraction (1   ) of the considered time slot. Again the analysis
is simplied by assuming that the secondary transmission uses the same codeword
for the articial noise and the same power allocation strategy (i.e., the same ) as
previously. The received signal at the SR (after removing the articial noise) is
XSR =
p
Pshsss1 + nSR; (5.12)







(1  )Pshsez + nED; (5.13)
where s1 is the secondary message signal and hss  CN (0; 2h) is the channel
coecient between the ST and SR. After removing the articial noise at the SR,
the information rate at the SR is represented as






Additionally, the leakage rate at the ED in this phase can be written as
R
(3)
SE = (1  ) log2(
(1 + se)
(1 + (1  )se)): (5.15)
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Similarly, the SSR, denoted by RSSEC , can be obtained as
RSSEC = RSS  R(3)SE




(1 + (1  )se)

: (5.16)
5.2.2 Maximisation of achievable secrecy rates using a
Stackelberg game
The maximisation problem of available secrecy rates can be formulated as a
Stackelberg game wherein the PT is considered the leader and the ST the follower.
The leader attempts to maximise its primary secrecy rate, Rpsec, while the follower
attempts to maximise its utility. The optimal transmission parameters for the PT,
(; ), and the corresponding power choice of the ST, ; are jointly referred to as
the Stackelberg equilibrium. Figure 6.3 shows the interaction between the primary
and secondary transmissions. The ST is aware of parameters (; ) and optimises
Figure 5.3: Stackelberg game model
its power level towards the goal of maximising its utility:
USSEC(; ; (; )) = RSSEC   k; (5.17)
where k is the pricing constant. The following lemma is considered.
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5.2 Enhancing secrecy rates using a Stackelberg game: a single
eavesdropper (Scenario I)
Lemma 5. The utility of the secondary transmission in Equation (6.16) is concave
with respect to .
Proof: Please see Appendix 2.A.
The optimal solution to the secondary transmission problem can be obtained
as
 = arg max
0<;;<1
USSEC(; ; (; )): (5.18)
To nd the optimum , it is possible to dierentiate Ussec with respect to  and








(1 + (1  )se)

  k = 0
) k=q = ss
(1 + ss)
  se
(1 + (1  )se) (5.19)
After simplication,  is obtained as
a2 + b+ c = 0; (5.20)
where
a = ssse; (5.21)






(ss   se + ssse)  se   1: (5.23)
Therefore, the optimal  is
 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0; 2  0
1; 1  1
max2f1;2g Ussec(); 0  1  2  1










The PT, acting as the game leader, determines the fraction  and the ratio  with
the goal of maximising its secrecy rate, knowing that its decision will aect the
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strategy selected by the ST (the follower). The solution is




Theorem 1. The allocated power level  and time slot  are the Nash equilibrium
of the proposed game.
Proof: According to the DF scheme, it would be assumed that Rsp  Rps
in order to nd the relationship between  and  to facilitate the solution of the
above optimization problem. The following relationship can be obtained according
to the assumption of the DF scheme:
RSP = RPS





According to Lemma 1, USSEC is strictly concave in terms of  for a given values
of  and . Furthermore, if RPSEC is an increasing function of , then the
primary transmission (leader) will select the best response () of the secondary
transmission (follower) as
 = argmaxRPSEC(; ()): (5.27)
Therefore,  and () form the Nash equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg
game.
5.3 Extension to multiple eavesdroppers
(Scenario II)
Scenario II (see Figure 6.2) is considered by having multiple eavesdroppers which
are located in the range of the ST to highlight their eect on the secrecy rates. In
this case, it cannot be assumed that all eavesdroppers are located out of range of
the PT, as was possible in Scenario 1. Instead, to enhance the secure transmission,
the SR is considered as a jammer with multiple transmission antennas, and suppose
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that it transmits a jamming signal in Phase 1. The three phases are considered in
the cases of colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers, and closed-form expressions
are derived for both the PSR and SSR in each case.
5.3.1 Case I: colluding eavesdroppers
In this case, all eavesdroppers cooperate via central processing such that they can
be considered as a single eavesdropper with multiple antennas. We assume that the
eavesdroppers are homogeneous; that is, each eavesdropper experiences the same
received signal power on average. Moreover, all eavesdroppers are uniformly located
around a legitimate ST [106].
1) Phase 1 : The PT is considered to cooperate with the ST by allocating only
a fraction (1 ) of the whole time slot, whereas the SR, with multiple transmitting
antennas, sends the jamming signal using power vector wJ to both the ST and ED





PJhrswJzJ + nST ; (5.28)
where h(rs)  N (0K ; d IK) is the channel vector (of length K due to K multiple
transmit antennas at the SR) between the SR and ST, zJ  CN (0; 1),  is the path
loss exponent, d is the distance between the SR and ST, and nST  CN (0; 2). The





PJhrewJzJ + nED;i; (5.29)
where h(re)  N (0K ; d IK) is the channel vector (of length K due to K multiple
transmit antennas at the SR) between the SR and ST, and nED;i  CN (0; 2).
Using projection matrix theory to remove an interference of the SR (the jammer) in
the legal receiver (the ST) , jwJ j can be achieved as follows:
jwJ j = (I  hrs(hrshrs
y) 1hyrs)hre((I  hrs(hrshrsy) 1hyrs)hre ; (5.30)
where jwJwJ yj = 1.
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Therefore, the information rate at the ST is is given by Equation (6.3), while
the leakage rate at EDi can be written as





where WJ = wJwJ
y:
2) Phase 2 : The ST has a DF relay function and forwards the secure primary
message, s^, to the PR in  in the presence of L eavesdroppers according to a
parameter 0 <  < 1. The received signal, XPR, and rate, RSP , are given by
Equation (6.41) and Equation (6.42), respectively, due to cancelling of articial
noise in the PR. The leakage rate, RSEi, at the i
th ED can then be written as
RSE;i =  log2(1 +
Pshse
2 + PJ
hyrewJhre+ (1  )Pshse ); (5.32)
where hse  CN (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the ST and the ith ED.
In [106] and [121], the authors took the sum of the signal-to-interference-and-noise
ratio (SINR)s of the colluding eavesdroppers due to their cooperation. In this
chapter, assuming sequential Markov chain observations of the eavesdroppers and,
following [118], it is possible to utilise (
PL
i=1 log2(1 + SINRi))
= PLi=1 SINRi,
considering the approximation (log2(1 + SINRi)) = SINRi for long-distance
transmissions or energy-limited scenarios. This assumption represents the worst
case for eavesdroppers (i:e:(
PL
i=1 log2(1 + SINRi) > log2(1 +
PL
i=1 SINRi))).


















Moreover, the information rate, RP , at the PR is
RP = min(RPS; RSP )
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= min (log2(1 + ps); log2(1 + sp)) : (5.34)













2) Phase 3 : The ST transmits a secondary message to the SR in time slot
(1  ) in the presence of L eavesdroppers. The SR extracts only the information
signal, and the information rate at the SR is given by Equation (5.14), while the








hyreWJhre+ (1  )Pshse )
1A : (5.36)
The secondary secrecy rate, RSSEC , can be obtained by substituting Rss and
Rse such that
USSEC = RSSEC   k = RSS  R(3)SE   k







hyreWJhre+ (1  )Pshse )
1A
  k: (5.37)
Lemma 6. The utility of secondary transmission in colluding eavesdroppers
distributed uniformly around the legal transmitter is concave with respect to .
Proof: Please see Appendix 2.B.
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The interaction between the primary and secondary transmissions shown in
Figure 6.3 is considered. This case reects the impact of L eavesdroppers on the
PSR and SSR. To nd the optimum , USSEC can be dierentiated with respect to
. Assuming re =
PJ jhyreWJhrej
2
for simplicity, the optimal  is one of the positive
real roots of a2 + b+ c = 0; where a, b and c are given by
a = ssse; (5.38)
b = se   ss   ssse   ssre;






(ss   Lse + ssse + ssre)
  se   1  re: (5.40)
Theorem 1 can then be applied to nd the optimum values of (; ):
5.3.2 Case 2: non-colluding eavesdroppers
A non-homogeneous distribution of all eavesdroppers around the ST will be
considered; that is, the eavesdroppers are distributed randomly with dierent
distances around the ST. In this case, each eavesdropper will have its own
information rate, denoted by Rse;i; i = 1; 2;    ; L: Thus, the two following problems
are formulated:






where i = 1; 2; ::; L, Rpsec;i = Rps  Rse;i, and R(2)se;i is the leakage rate of the ith ED
in Phase 2. Note that
min
i
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where Rssec;i = Rss   R(3)se;i and R(3)se;i is the leakage rate of the ith ED in Phase 3.
Similarly, it is the case that
min
i





To solve the aforementioned two problems, each problem can be decomposed
into L independent subproblems, with the ith subproblem is corresponding to the
ith eavesdropper. The Stackelberg game-based algorithm proposed in Scenario I can
then be applied for the ith eavesdropper to nd the suboptimal values of ; ; and
:
5.4 Results and discussion
In this section, numerical results and related discussion are presented. The two
optimisation problems from the previous sections are considered according to the
Stackelberg game, and examine the secrecy performance under two scenarios.
5.4.1 Scenario I: comparison with previous work
This section compares our proposed system with a jammer that has caused an
interference in the legal receiver, as in [99]. The same setting used in this previous
study is considered: Ps=2mw, noise variance 
2 =1mw, pricing factor k = 0:01,
jhpsj2 = 0:6, jhsej2 = 0:3 and jhssj2 = 0:8. In [99], the authors considered two
secondary users (one for the relay and another for the jammer) in order to enhance
the secrecy rates in the primary transmission of the CR. Two schemes represented
a relay non-friendly jammer (R-J) and an equal-duration relay non-friendly jammer
(EDRJ). Note that the only dierence between EDRJ and R-J schemes is that in an
EDRJ scheme, the time durations for the rst two phases are equal and the secrecy
rate is maximized without considering the time allocation. The proposed scheme
is now compared with these two schemes. Figure 5.6 indicates that the proposed
system outperforms the R-J and EDRJ schemes signicantly due to removal of
interference from the jamming signal at legal destinations.
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Figure 5.7 shows a comparison between the proposed system and equal-duration
relay jammer transmissions (EDJ) with respect to hse. The EDJ scheme treats the
SR as a potential eavesdropper with respect to the primary transmission. Since
the primary users are the legacy owners of the spectrum, the condentiality of the
primary message should be considered. In this context, the PT may be assisted
by the trustworthy ST if such cooperation can improve the secrecy performance,
with the ST awarded a share of the spectrum for its data transmission. Hence, the
ST acts as a friendly jammer and the time durations of the primary and jammer
transmissions are the same. This scheme is similar to the jammer in [98], except that
the EDJ does not cause an interference with the legal transmitter. This comparison
highlights the eect of an interaction between the time and power allocation by
the Stackelberg game on a balance-performing process between maximum values for
both the primary and secondary secrecy rates. It is notable that the proposed system
has a slightly lower primary secrecy rate than the friendly jammer, particularly
in the case of a high channel coecient between the legitimate transmitter and
eavesdropper. In contrast, the secondary secrecy rate of the proposed system is
signicantly higher than that of the friendly jammer. Moreover, the proposed system
has a less signicant gap between the primary and secondary secrecy rates than the
EDJ scheme. Consequently, the PSR and SSR of the Stackelberg game are fairer
than those of the EDJ, due to the tradeo between allocated power, , and time
durations,  and , in obtaining maximum values for the primary and secondary
secrecy rates.
5.4.2 Fixed locations of the PR, ST and SR
The PR, ST and SR locations are xed at the coordinates (0, 0.6), (0, 0), and (0,
0.4), respectively, to nd the eect of PT and ED distances on the PSR and SSR.
These coordinates are normalised to a square area with 1km2. Te path loss model
hij = d
  with path loss exponent  = 3 is applied. The primary and secondary
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) are set to 5 dB and the pricing coecient to k = 0:25.
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Figure 6.6 indicates the optimum primary and secondary secrecy rates with
respect to the distance between the PT and ST when the coordinates of the ED
are xed at (1, 0). Notably, the optimum secrecy rates of both the primary and
secondary transmissions decrease when the PT is farther away from the ST. This
is because a decreasing ps reduces Rps according to Equation (6.3). Hence, the
information rate of the relay ST decreases according to the condition Rsp  Rps:
Figure 6.7 shows the optimum PSR and SSR with respect to distance of the
ED when the location of the PT is xed at (0.2, 0). The optimum secrecy rates of
both the primary and secondary transmissions increase when the ED is further away
from the ST because the information rate of the ED decreases with degradation of
hse according to Equation (6.8) and Equation (6.31).
Figure 5.10 shows the optimum  (power level fraction of the ST carrying the
message signal) with respect to the distance between the PT and ST when the
coordinates of the ED are xed at (1.0, 0). It is found that the optimum  decreases
when the PT is far away from the ST, because the received power at the ST decreases
with increasing distance between the ED and ST. This gure also shows the optimum
 versus the distance between the ED and ST when the coordinates of the PT are
xed at (0,0.2). In this case the optimum  increases when the ED is farther from
the ST because (1  ) decreases with the decreasing information rate of the ED.
Figure 5.11 shows the optimum  and  versus the distance between the PT
and ST when the coordinates of the ED are xed at (1.0,0). It is found that 
changes slightly with distance, whereas  decreases signicantly with distance for
two reasons. First, the activation time for transmission between the PT and the
relay is independent of , according to Equation (6.3); and secondly, the activation
time for transmission between the relay ST and PR decreases with increasing (1 )
(the time slot for transmission between the PT and relay) due to the degradation
of hps and Rps according to Equation (6.3).
Figure 5.12 shows the optimum  and  against the distance between the ED
and ST when the coordinates of the PT are (0,0.2). Here,  is reduced signicantly
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because hse has its main eect on the relay and secondary transmissions in Phase
2 () and Phase 3 (1  ) according to Equation (6.8) and Equation (6.31),
respectively. Additionally,  decreases less signicantly because hse has no eect
on Phase 1 (1 ) of the primary transmission, as a result of our assumption that
the primary transmission is invisible at the ED.
5.4.3 Fixed locations of the PT, PR, ST and SR
The locations of the PT, PR, ST, and SR are xed at the coordinates (0,0.2),(0.6,
0), (0, 0), and (0, 0.4), respectively, in order to determine the eect of sp on the
secrecy rates in the two later phases. Three schemes are considered depending on
the locations of the ED: Scheme I (1.0,0), Scheme II (0.9,0), and Scheme III (0.6,0).
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show the optimum primary and secondary secrecy rates with
respect to sp in these three schemes. For all three schemes, the optimum secrecy
rates increase signicantly with sp according to Equation (6.8) and Equation (6.31).
5.4.4 Scenario II
The same locations and parameters as in the preceding subsection are now
considered, but with K=2. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show that the primary and
secondary secrecy rates decrease signicantly in both cases with an increasing
number of eavesdroppers, according to Equation (6.23) and Equation (B.2).
Moreover, Scheme II (with non-colluding eavesdroppers) has a secrecy rate higher
than that of Scheme I (with colluding eavesdroppers) because Scheme I combines the
eects of all eavesdroppers, while Scheme II selects the worst response (minimum
secrecy rate) from one of the eavesdroppers.
Figure 5.17 shows that  decreases signicantly with an increasing number of
eavesdroppers, because more power should be allocated to the articial noise as the
number of eavesdroppers grows. Additionally,  reaches a higher level when the
distance between the ST and ED increases, due to the fact that less power should
be allocated to the articial noise if Res1 is reduced.
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Figure 5.18 shows that  increases signicantly with an increasing number of
eavesdroppers, because the activation time of Phases II and III must be increased
to maintain reasonable values for the secrecy rates with more eavesdroppers.
Furthermore,  must increase with larger distances between the ST and ED.
5.5 Part II: physical layer security via a
multi-level Stackelberg game
The aforementioned studies focused on enhancing the primary secrecy rate and
the secondary transmission rate, under the assumption that the eavesdropper can
intercept the primary transmission only. Inspired by the study in [?], a new scenario
is proposed wherein the PT allows the ST to access its spectrum for better secrecy
performance. It is assumed that the ED can intercept both the primary and
secondary transmissions in the worst case, and the ST is used as a trusted relay
and jammer for primary transmission. It is also assumed that the PT and ST can
allocate some of their transmission power to transmit articial noise and thereby
create interference at the ED. In such networks, a primary user may lease portions
of a licensed spectrum to a secondary user in exchange for enhanced performance.
This scenario avoids the regulatory issues or money transactions that commonly
hinder the implementation of the property-rights spectrum leasing concept. The
main contributions of this work are:
 A resource allocation scheme (i.e., power and time resources) is proposed for
spectrum leasing to maximise the primary secrecy rate (PSR), relay secrecy
rate (RSR), and secondary secrecy rate (SSR) with perfect knowledge of
channel state information (CSI).
 The unique value of the proposed Stackelberg game equilibrium is obtained.
 It is shown that the secrecy rate of the proposed system using a multi-level




 Comparisons with previous work are provided to show the signicant
improvement to security in the proposed system.
5.6 System models
Similarly to the problems considered previously, the CRN consists of the following
single-antenna nodes: a primary transmitter (PT), a cognitive secondary transmitter
(ST), a primary receiver (PR), a secondary receiver (SR), and an eavesdropper
(ED) (Figure 5.4). A CRN is considered wherein a ST transmits to a SR using the
spectrum between a PT and a PR under malicious attempts by an ED. It is assumed
that each node carries a single omnidirectional antenna, the relaying strategy is
decode-and-forward (DF), and the global channel state information (CSI) is available
by a standard channel estimation (CE) technique, the training-based CE (TBCE).
There is no extra jammer, but a priori knowledge of jamming signals is available at
legitimate receivers. This is achieved by communication of a key for articial noise
between the legal source and destination [119, 120]. To enhance secrecy rates, the
legitimate transmitters are permitted to use a portion of their power to transmit a
jamming signal, in addition to transmitting the message signal.
We have three phases for transmissions: the primary secrecy rate in Phase I
(PSR), the relay secrecy rate in Phase II (RSR), and the secondary secrecy rate
in Phase III (SSR). Since the ED can intercept the primary, relay, and secondary
transmissions in three phases, our objective is to improve the secrecy rates in all
three via transmission of appropriate jamming signals.
Phase 1 : Using a fraction of the considered time slot (1 ), where 0 <  < 1,





(1  1)Pphpsz1 + nST ; (5.43)
where s1 is the message signal, z1 is articial noise, nST  CN (0; 2) is the noise
at the ST, 1 is the PT's allocated power for transmission of the primary message,
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of the CR system model
and hps  CN (0; 2h) is the channel coecient between the primary and secondary





It is assumed that the ST has a priori knowledge of the articial noise. The
achievable secrecy rate RPSR in Phase I can be calculated as follows:
RPSR = Rps  Rpe; (5.44)
RPSR = (1  )

log2(1 + 1ps)  log2(
(1 + pe)
(1 + (1  1)se))

: (5.45)
Phase 2 : The ST functions as a trusted relay to forward a secure primary message,





(1  2)Pshspz2 + nPR; (5.46)
where s^1 is the re-encoded message signal, z2 is articial noise, 2 is the power
allocated to the ST for relaying the primary message, and hsp  CN (0; 2h) is the
channel coecient between the secondary transmitter and primary receiver. After
removing the articial noise at the primary receiver, the achievable secrecy rate in
Phase II, RRPR, becomes
RRPR = Rsp  Rse; (5.47)
RRPR = () [log2(1 + 2sp)
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 log2(
(1 + se + (1  1)pe)













Phase 3 : The ST sends secure secondary message to the SR in time slot (1  ).





(1  2)Pshssz2 + nSR; (5.49)
where s2 is the secondary message signal and hss  CN (0; 2h) is the channel
coecient between the secondary transmitter and receiver. It is assumed that
the same codewords for articial noise are used in the primary and secondary
transmissions. After removing the articial noise at the secondary receiver, the
following secrecy rate is obtained in Phase III RSSR:
RSSR = Rss  Rse; (5.50)
RSSR = (1  ) [log2(1 + 2ss)
  log2(
1 + se + (1  1)pe








5.7 A secrecy rate measure and game-theoretic
model
Throughout this section, the nodes are dened as selsh and rational to capture
non-altruistic behaviour. An appropriate framework for analysing the interaction
between such nodes is a multi-level Stackelberg game. If this game includes M
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players with N levels, then the lth player is the follower of the (l 1)th player at the
ith level and is a leader of the (l+1)th player at the (i+1)th level, where 1 < i < N
and 1 < l < M: Furthermore, the rst player is the leader at the rst level and
the Mth player is the follower at the Nth level. In general, the number of levels is
equal to the number of players minus one (i.e., N = M   1). Hence, two levels of
the Stackelberg game are applied (Figure 5.5) to maximise the secrecy rates in the
three phases, which are our players.
Figure 5.5: A two-level Stackelberg game for the proposed system
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5.7.1 Level 1
The leader and follower are the PT and relay transmissions, respectively. The
optimal value 1 can be represented as
1 = argmaxRPSR(; 1): (5.52)
Lemma 7. The secrecy rate at Phase I in Equation (6.7) is concave in terms of 1.
Proof: In order to prove the concavity of the primary transmission's utility,












(1 + (1  1)pe)2 )

; (5.53)
where q1 = (1   )= ln 2: As this second derivative is negative, the secrecy rate in
Phase I is concave with respect to 1.








(1 + (1  1)pe)

= 0; (5.54)
and from Equation (C.5), it is derived that
1 =




At the second level, the leader and follower are the relay and the secondary
transmissions, respectively. The optimal primary strategy, 1 , relay transmitter
strategy, (; ), and the corresponding power choice of the secondary transmitter,
2
, comprise the Stackelberg equilibrium. Interactions between the transmissions
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in the three phases are shown in Figure 6.2. The ST is aware of parameters (; )
and optimises its power level with the goal of maximising its utility:
Ussec(; ; 

1; 2(; )) = RSSR   k2; (5.56)
where k is a pricing constant. Again according to Lemma 1, the utility of the
secondary transmission in Equation (6.14) is concave in terms of 2. The optimal
solution of secondary transmission problem can be derived as
2
 = argmaxUssec(; ; 1; 2(; )); (5.57)
subject to 0 <  < 1, 0 <  < 1, and 0 < 2 < 1. To nd the optimum 2
, Ussec
can be dierentiated with respect to 2 and equated to zero. After simplication, 2
is obtained as follows:
a2
2 + b2 + c = 0; (5.58)
where
a = ssse; (5.59)







(ss   se + ssse + sspe(1  1)) (5.62)





2 can then be obtained.
The relay transmission determines the fractions  and  with the goal of
maximising its secrecy rate, knowing that its decision will aect the strategy selected
by the ST:
;  = arg max
0<;;1;2<1
RRPR(; ; 1
; 2(; )): (5.64)
Theorem 2. The allocated power levels, 1; 

2, and time slot, 
, are the Nash
equilibrium of the proposed game.
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Proof: According to the DF scheme, it is assumed that Rsp  Rps in order
to nd the relationship between  and  to facilitate the solution of the above
optimisation problem:
RSP = RPS





According to Lemma 1 in Phases 1 and 3, RPSR and Ussec are strictly concave in
terms of 1 and 2 for given values of  and . Furthermore, if RRSR is an increasing
function of , then the relay transmission (leader) in Level 2 will select the best
responses, 1 of the leader in Level 1 and 

2() of the follower in Level 2, as follows:
 = argmaxRPSEC(; 1; 

2()): (5.66)
Therefore, ; 1, and 

2(
) form the Nash equilibrium of the proposed Stackelberg
game.
Lemma 8. The Stackelberg game has a higher secrecy rate with N levels than with
N-1 levels.
Proof: N = 2 is considered in order to make a direct comparison between
a single- and two-level Stackelberg game. In the single level, it is assumed that
that the PT is out of range of the eavesdropper to remove the impact of the primary
transmitter (the leader in Level 1), which is represented by 1. In this case, the single
level of the Stackelberg game is needed between the relay transmission (leader) and
secondary transmission (follower). Following the procedure that was used for Phases




(1) = Rsp  Rse(2)
=  [log2(1 + 2sp)
 log2(
(1 + se)





To highlight the enhancement of the primary secrecy rate by the two-level
Stackelberg game, it is necessary to prove that
RRPR  RRPR(1) > 0: (5.68)
Since Rsp is same in both the single-level and two-level Stackelberg game, it is
possible to obtain
2sp
(1 + (1  2)se) >
2sp
(1 + (1  2)se + (1  1)pe)
! pe(1  1) > 0: (5.69)
5.8 Numerical results
This section presents numerical results and some related discussions. Two
optimisation problems from the previous section are considered according to the
Stackelberg game. Our simulation consists of two steps. Firstly, the following
parameters are considered to provide the same setting as in a previous study [99]:
Ps = 2mw, noise variance 
2 = 1mw, pricing factor c1 = 0:25, jHpsj2 = 0:6, jHsej2 =
0:3, and jHssj2 = 0:8. Figure 5.19 shows a comparison of our proposed scenario
with the previous study, which used one secondary user for relay and a second
one as a non-friendly jammer. In [99], the authors proposed relay-and-jammer
(R-J) and equal-duration relay jammer (EDRJ) schemes to the enhance secrecy
rate in the CR. In Figure 5.19, the secrecy rate is plotted versus the channel gain
between the legitimate source and destination, (HSD). As before, our proposed
system outperforms the R-J and EDRJ schemes signicantly, due to its removal of
articial noise, and hence interference, from the legal receiver, and its increase in
interference at the eavesdropper due to the interaction between the two levels of the
Stackelberg game.
To determine the eect of the signal-to-noise ratio on the secrecy rates in three
phases, we x the locations of the PT, PR, ST, ED, and SR at the coordinates
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(0.2,0),(0.6, 0), (0, 0),(0,1), and (0, 0.4), respectively, the path loss model Hij = d
 
is assumed with path loss exponent  = 3:0 and the pricing coecient k = 0:25.
Figure 5.20 visualises the optimum optimum primary single-level and two-level
secrecy rates versus the SNR. It is notable that the primary secrecy rate is improved
by the multi-level Stackelberg game according to Lemma 2. Furthermore, the
primary secrecy rate of the two-level Stackelberg game increases more signicantly
than that of the single level, due to the residual eect of ps on the two-level secrecy
according to Equation (6.12).
Finally, a scenario is considered in which the PT, ST, SR, and ED have the
same locations as in Figure 5.20, but the PR is in a dierent location, to determine
the eect of the destination location on the primary and secondary power allocations
and time allocations. Figure 5.21 shows the optimum PSR, RSR, and SSR versus the
SNR. Notably, the optimum secrecy rates of all three phases increase signicantly
with the increasing SNR, due to the increased ps, sp, and ss, respectively.
5.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, a game theory-based cooperation method has been proposed to
optimise the primary secrecy rate and secondary secrecy rate in CRNs. This
mechanism is built upon the spectrum leasing paradigm, wherein a secondary
transmitter is permitted to use some of its own power level to transmit articial
noise to the destination(s) and the legitimate destination has prior knowledge of
this articial noise. Interaction between the cooperative nodes is based on the
Stackelberg game concept. Two scenarios have been considered, one with a single
eavesdropper and one with multiple eavesdroppers, wherein optimisation problems
were formatted and solved in each scheme with the aim of maximising the achievable
secrecy rates on the primary and secondary transmissions, subject to constraints on
the allocated power and leased time slots. Numerical results have conrmed that our
proposed cooperative scheme signicantly improves the secrecy rates of the CRNs.
Furthermore, it has been observed numerically that the achievable PSR and SSR
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of the Stackelberg game is fairer than those of other algorithms in the literature,
due to the tradeo between the allocated power and the time slot durations in
the Stackelberg game. Moreover, two levels of Stackelberg game-based cooperation
have been proposed to to optimize the physical layer security of both primary and
secondary transmissions in CRNs. A constrained optimisation problem has been
formulated and solved to maximise the achievable secrecy rates on the primary,
relay, and secondary transmissions, again subject to constraints on power allocation
and time slots. Numerical results have conrmed that our proposed cooperative
scheme signicantly improves the primary and secondary secrecy rates of CRNs.
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Figure 5.6: Secrecy rate: comparison with jammer-caused interference at the
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Figure 5.7: Secrecy rate: comparison with a friendly jammer without interference
at the approach to the legitimate receiver
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Figure 5.9: Secrecy rate versus distance between the ED and ST
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Figure 5.11:  and  versus distance between the PT and ST
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Figure 5.17:  versus the number of eavesdroppers
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Figure 5.19: Comparison for the primary secrecy rate
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Figure 5.20: Comparison of the secrecy rate versus the SNR
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Figure 5.21: Secrecy rate versus the SNR
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Chapter 6
Physical layer security of cognitive
radio systems via distributive
matching theory
In this chapter, cooperative spectrum sharing is considered in a cognitive
radio network consisting of multiple primary and multiple secondary users. A
particular focus is physical-layer security in cognitive radio networks, wherein
multiple secondary nodes assist multiple primary nodes in combating unwanted
eavesdropping from a malicious eavesdroppers. Two scenarios are considered: a
single eavesdropper and multiple eavesdroppers. In Scenario I, the secondary users
act as a relay and jammer, whereas the secondary users act as a jammer only
in Scenario II. Multiple eavesdroppers are also considered, and are distributed
according to a homogenous Poison Point Process (PPP). The primary and secondary
secrecy rates are studied to nd the solution of the developed matching game that
yields a stable matching between the sets of the primary and secondary users. Closed
forms for the outage probability and mean secrecy rate for both the primary and
secondary transmissions are derived. Furthermore, the saleability and convergence
of the matching theory are proved. Both the analytical and numerical results show
that the proposed matching model is a promising approach under which the utility
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functions of both primary and secondary users are maximised.
6.1 Introduction
A utility-based matching framework is proposed that motivates multiple primary
nodes and multiple secondary nodes to cooperate with each other such that the
sum-secrecy rate over all source nodes is maximised. Within the money transfer
framework, primary nodes provide monetary compensation to motivate secondary
nodes to allocate secondary power to relay the primary information signal and
interfere with the eavesdropper. This will be achieved by utilising matching
theory and auction theory, which provide a convenient framework for algorithm
development and performance analysis. The main contributions of this study are
summarised as follows:
1. To our knowledge, this study provides a novel framework that can address the
general matching scenario to enhance security for both primary and secondary
transmissions.
2. Scenario I { single eavesdropper: Matching theory and auction theory are
applied to the allocated secondary power to relay the primary message and
create interference with the eavesdropper. Simulation results show that the
proposed scheme provides a signicant increase in the primary secrecy rate
(PSR) at the expense of a slight reduction in the secondary secrecy rate (SSR)
in comparison with the corresponding central algorithm.
3. Scenario I { multiple eavesdroppers: Matching theory and auction theory
are applied to the allocated secondary power to create interference with the
eavesdroppers. Again, simulation results show that the proposed scheme
provides a signicant increase in the primary secrecy rate (PSR) at the expense




4. Scenario II { multiple eavesdroppers: To highlight the impact of multiple
eavesdroppers on the PSR and SSR, the proposed CR systems are analysed
under the malicious attempt of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers that
are distributed according to a homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP)
distribution around primary and secondary transmitters. It is shown that
the mean secrecy rate achieved for CR systems under the non-colluding
eavesdroppers is signicantly higher than that under the traditional central
algorithm.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section II, the system
model and achievable secrecy rates for Scenario I are dened. In Section III, the
optimisation problems are presented for the given scenarios and their matching
game-theoretic approaches. Section IV presents the proposed algorithm to solve
optimisation problems, and Section VI shows the convergence of PSMA. Section VII
indicates the system model for the CR in Scenario II and the problem formulation
for Scenario II. These scenarios are then compared via numerical simulations in
Section VIII, and Section IX presents and discusses the numerical results. Finally,
Section X concludes the chapter.
6.2 System model
In this section, a CRN is considered, illustrated in Figure 6.1, consisting of N pairs
of a primary transmitter node, PTi, and its corresponding receiver node, PRi (where
i = 1; 2;    ; N),M pairs of a secondary transmitter node STj and its corresponding
secondary receiver node, SRj (where j = 1; 2;    ;M), and a malicious eavesdropper
(ED). It is assumed that the primary pairs, secondary receivers, and ED have single
antennae, while the secondary transmitters have K transmit antennas each. The




Figure 6.1: The considered scenario
In general, the secrecy rate Rsec is dened as:
Rsec = (RD  RE)+; (6.1)
where RD and RE are the information rates at the destination and eavesdropper,
respectively; and (x)+ = max(0; x) refers to the positivity value of the secrecy rate.
For convenience, the ()+ sign is omitted from subsequent calculations.
6.2.1 Mathematical models
The system has three phases as follows:
1) Phase 1 : The PTis decide to cooperate by using a fraction (1   T ) of the
whole time slot for transmission from the primary nodes to the preferred secondary
node, STj (where 0 < T < 1). The remaining fraction will be used in Phases 2 and
3. It is assumed that transmission from the PTis is invisible at the ED. In this rst







i;j si + n
(ST )
j ; (6.2)





j  N (0; 2) is the noise at STj, and h(ps)i;j  N (0; 2h) is the channel coecient












Then, the information rate at the STj, denoted by R
(ps)




(1  T ) log2(1 + (ps)i;j )
2
: (6.3)
2) Phase 2 : The STj, having multiple transmit antennas, forwards the secure
primary message to the PRi within the fraction (1  T ) (where 0 <  < 1) of the
considered time slot. In this phase, for security reasons, the STj also transmits the
articial noise zj in addition to the re-encoded primary signal s^i using power vectors
















j;i  N (0K ; d j;i IK) is the channel vector (of length K due to K multiple
transmit antennas at STj) between STj and PRi;  is the pass loss exponent, and

















j  N (0K ; d j;EIK) is the channel vector between the STj and the ED, and










where Uj = uju
y
j and Vj = vjv
y
j : At the same time, the information rate at the ED














According to Equation (6.1), the achievable primary secrecy rate (PSR), denoted
by R
(PSR)
j;i ; can be obtained as follows:
R
(PSR)


















3) Phase 3 : The STj can now send its own secure secondary message, sj, to
the SRj within the remaining faction T (1 ) of the considered time slot, using the
power allocation vector u0j. Again, it is assumed that the same codeword for articial
noise (with power allocation vector v0j) and the same power allocation strategy are



















j  N (0K ; d j;j IK) is the channel vector of length K between STj and








































: Also, the information rate at the ED in














Similarly, the secondary secrecy rate (SSR), denoted by R
(SSR)






















6.2.2 Utility function and problem formulation for
enhancing security
It is assumed that the STjs and PRis have global instantaneous CSI information
and that STj has the knowledge of the CSI to the ED and the CSI between PRi
and SRj. The utility function of the primary transmission can be selected to be
increasing with  and decreasing with the eavesdropper's information rate. The
primary utility, denoted by UPj;i ; can be written as
UPj;i = RPRi  R(2)ED + cpPs; (6.14)
where cp is a pricing constant. Moreover, the utility of the secondary transmission,
denoted by USj;j ; can be written as
USj;j = RSRj  R(3)ED   cpPs: (6.15)
Given the channel knowledge, its power weight vector can be designed to maximize
interference to the ED while minimising the interference to both PRi and SRj: The
solution of the weight vector for the secondary transmission is given by
v0j =arg max
0<<1
h(se)j yV0jh(se)j  (6.16)
s.t.




y j = 1:
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Using projection matrix theory to provide the solution of the optimisation problem
in Equation (6.16),
v0j  can be achieved as follows:
jv0j j =




)h(se)(I  h(ss)j (h(ssj h(ss)j y) 1h(ss)j y)h(se) : (6.17)
Similarly, using the above method, the optimal solution of vj in the primary
transmission can be obtained by solving the following problem:
vj =arg max
0<<1
h(se)j yVjh(se)j  (6.18)
s.t.
h(sp)j;i yVjh(sp)j;i  = 0;
jvjvyj j = 1:
The solution is then given by
jvj j =




)h(se)(I  h(sp)j;i (h(sp)j;i h(sp)j;i y) 1h(sp)j;i y)h(se) : (6.19)
6.3 Matching theory and formulation of the
optimisation problem
In this section, PTi will be paired with STj using matching theory. It is convenient
to rst introduce some notation in matching theory.
Denition 1 : A matching function is dened:
 : fpi : i 2 PT [ f0gg [ fsi : i 2 ST [ f0gg
! fpi : i 2 PT [ f0gg [ fsi : i 2 ST [ f0gg
fR+ [ f0gg (6.20)
such that for all pi 2 PT and sj 2 ST :
1.  (pi) = (s0; i;0)) i;0 = 0 and Ps = 0.
2.  (sj) = (p0; 0;j)) 0;j = 0 and cp = 0.
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3.  (pi) = (sj; i;j),  (sj) = (pi; i;j).
A dummy primary transmitter node (p0) and a dummy secondary transmitter
node (s0) can be considered, which are convenient for notational purposes. To see
this, in Step 1 of Denition 1, a primary node is considered that is \not matched";
that is, no secondary node is cooperating with this primary node, which is equivalent
to i;0 = 0 and secondary power. In Step 2 of Denition 1, if a secondary node is
\not matched," i.e., it does not provide relay services for any primary node, then it
follows that the utility for this secondary node is zero. Finally, it is implied that pi
is matched to sj with i;j and then sj is matched to pi with i;j:
According to the matching denition, the following objective problem can be







mi;j(UPj;i + USj;j); (6.21)












The objective of our problem is now to nd the matching matrix that maximises the
total secrecy rate of the cognitive network. Therefore, the following is considered:











A distributive algorithm is proposed to solve this problem, as detailed in the next
section.
6.4 Proposed distributive algorithm
In order to solve the problem given by Equation (6.23), the primary-secondary
matching algorithm (PSMA) is now proposed, which is inspired by the deferred
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acceptance algorithm. A new function is rst dened:
i;j =
8>>><>>>:
1; if PTj is in the highest priority position
of the secondary user list, and
0; otherwise.
(6.24)
Details of the algorithm are as follows:
1. Step 1: Initialisation
(a) Each PTi broadcasts its , where  > min, to all STs and constructs its
preference list, PTList. Also, the unmatched list of primary users, UML,
is constructed.
(b) Each STj constructs its preference list, STList, according to the
announced .
2. Step 2: Main implementation
(a) PTi oers i;j to the rst SUj in its preference list.
(b) If STj is not matched and PTi is in its preference list, then the matching
index mi;j = 1 and PTi is removed from the UML.
(c) Else if STj is already matched to the current primary user, PTcurr, but
PTi has higher priority than PTcurr in the preference list of STj; then





meaning that PTi is located at the highest priority level in at least two
secondary users' preference lists, then
(it+1) = (it) + ;
where  is the step size and (it) is an iteration index. Then, update PTi
and return to the rst part of Step 2.
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(e) If PTi is not in the preference list of STj and STj is still not matched
with (it) > min, then let 
(it+1) = (it)    with (it) > min and
update its preference list according to the new value of .
3. Step 3: if UML 6= , return to Step 2
Denition 2 : A matching is dened as stable if it is not blocked by any individual
or any pair. It should be noted that, in order to achieve a stable matching, the
number of primary node pairs does not have to be equal to the number of relays
(i.e., M 6= N).
Lemma 9. The PSMA converges to a stable matching.
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Denition 3 : The matching and the allocated time slot (), which are produced
by the PSMA, are said to be in competitive equilibrium if the following conditions
are satised:
1. The matched relay Sj always receives a non-negative utility (i.e. i;j  min).




Upj;i ; if (pi) = (sj; i;j);  (sj) = (pi; i;j):
3. If the Pi is not matched, then i;j = min.
Theorem 3. The matching and the allocated time slot () produced by the PSMA
are in competitive equilibrium for small values of .
Proof: According to the conditions in Denition 3, the PSMA must satisfy
the conditions in 1, 2, and 3. From Step 1-a of the PSMA, if each PTi oers at least
min to the relay STj, then the relay satises Condition 1. From Step 2-d of the
PSMA, (it+1)  (it), since the primary utility has an increasing function with ,
and it follows that it has a higher value in the next iteration. From Step 2-e of the
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PSMA, since PT continues to reduce its  oer if the PT is not matched and its
  min, it follows that the PT's  equals at least min if the PT is not matched.
6.5 Convergence of the PSMA
The convergence behaviour of the PSMA is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The upper limit of iterations needed to converge for the PSMA is
L = (max   min)=; (6.25)




Proof: According to Step 2-d of the PSMA,  is incremented by  when
the PT has oers from at least two STs wishing to relay the PT's signal. Therefore,
the PT cannot obtain matching with an ST at max + . On the other hand, from
Step 2-e of the PSMA, if  is decremented by  because the PT remains unmatched,
and its  > min, then the PT cannot also match with the ST at min  . Thus, it
can be concluded that in the worst case, the PT will match after (max   min)=
iterations.
6.6 Extension to non-colluding eavesdroppers
(Scenario II)
Scenario II, which has non-colluding eavesdroppers, is considered in order to
highlight the eect of multiple eavesdroppers on the secrecy rates. In this scenario,
the multiple eavesdroppers are distributed according to a PPP, and it is not possible
to apply a projection matrix to design the weighting of precoding to maximise
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interference at the eavesdropper. However, the precoding weight jwJ j can be selected
to satisfy the following two conditions:
1.
h(sp)j;i ywj = 0:
2. jwJwJ yj = 1:
To satisfy these conditions, it is necessary to send jwJ j in the null space of h(sp)j;i .
Then the information rate at PR can be written as
R
(PP )







. As a worst case, it is assumed that each ED can cancel the
interference from other primary users. In this case, the ED receives the useful signal
embedded in the jamming signal and noise. The leakage rate at the lth ED can be
written as
RPE;l =  log2




According to Equation (6.1), the achievable primary secrecy rate (PPR), denoted














h(SE)l ywJ 2 )
375 : (6.28)
2) Phase 2 : The STj transmits the secondary message to SRj at time slot (1 ) in
the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers. The SRj extracts only the information
signal because the precoding weighting v0j can send only in the null space of 
(ss),
which in turn is because of the PPP distribution of multiple eavesdroppers. The
information rate at the SRj is
R
(SS)
j;j = (1  ) log2(1 + (ss)j;j ); (6.29)
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while the leakage rate at the lth eavesdropper can be written as
R
(2)







Furthermore, the secondary secrecy rate (SSR), denoted by Rj, can be obtained as
follows:

















6.7 Outage probability and mean secrecy rate in
Scenario II
This section derives the outage probability and the mean secrecy rate over
the location of the external non-colluding eavesdroppers. In non-colluding







h(SE)l ywJ 2 ; (6.32)






h(SE)l y v0j2 : (6.33)
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6.7.1 Outage probability of primary and secondary
transmissions
Lemma 10. The secrecy outage probability at the primary receiver, which is caused





























Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Lemma 11. When considering the special case of the path loss coecient being
equal to 4, the secrecy outage probability at the jth SR, which is caused by the
























Proof: Please see Appendix C.
6.7.2 Mean secrecy rate for primary and secondary
transmissions
Lemma 12. The mean secrecy rate achievable at the legal receivers for primary and
secondary transmissions can be obtained as
Ee [Rkjk > E;k] = (log2(1 + k)1 PoE;k
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log2(1 + x))dx; (6.36)












, b = 
32Ps exp(2=N 4)
42








: For the secondary



































. Furthermore, k = i;  = alpha for the primary transmissions
or k = j;  = 1   for the secondary transmissions, E;k is the SINR of the central
point with nearest location to the kth legal receiver.
Proof: Please see Appendix D.
6.8 The primary and secondary utility in Scenario
II
The primary utility, denoted by UPi ; can be written as
UPi = Ri + cpPs





fpe(x)log2(1 + x)dx) + cpPs: (6.39)
Furthermore, the utility of the secondary transmission, denoted by USj , can be
written as
USj = Rj   cpPs
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fse(x)log2(1 + x)dx)  cpPs: (6.40)
Based on matching theory, the following objective problem can be considered as







mi;j(UPi + USj); (6.41)








Furthermore, the matching matrix that maximises the TSR2 can be written as







The PSMA can also be applied in Scenario II using the primary and secondary
utilities in Equation (6.39) and Equation (6.40), respectively.
6.9 Numerical results and discussion
In this section, two scenarios are considered to highlight the eect of the PSMA
algorithm on improving the secrecy rate.
i) Scenario I - Single eavesdropper: To evaluate the performance
of the PSMA, three primary transmitter-receiver pairs, three secondary
transmitter-receiver pairs, and one eavesdropper are considered, where the secondary
transmitter nodes are located at coordinates (0m, 0m), (0m,10km) and (0m, 20km)
and the corresponding receiver nodes are located at coordinates (10km,10km),
(20km,10km) and (30km, 10km). The primary transmitter nodes are located at
coordinates (-10km, 0km), (-10km,10km) and (-10km, 20km) and the corresponding
receiver nodes are located at (10km, 0km), (10km, 10km) and(10km, 20km),
based on the Cartesian coordinate system. Finally, the eavesdropper is located
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at coordinate (35km,10km). Furthermore, it is assumed that K = 2;M = 3; N = 3,
 = 3, and 2 = 10 12; cp = 0:01. To demonstrate the benets of the PSMA, the
performance of the proposed system is compared with the centralised algorithm
in Equation (6.23). In the centralised algorithm, a centralised controller requires
feedback between the PUs and SUs, which causes overhead that may aect the
security of the system. Figure 6.2 indicates the average step size of the TSR versus
the PT as  is increased or decreased. The proposed primary secrecy rate curves
outperforms the centralised algorithm signicantly when the step size is increased
and converges to the centralised curve when the step size is reduced. In contrast,
the secondary secrecy rate of the proposed system decreases slightly with increasing
step size and approaches its corresponding value in the centralised curve when the
step size approaches zero.
Figure 6.2: Secrecy rate vs. step size
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ii) Scenario II - Multiple eavesdroppers: The secrecy outage probability
and mean secrecy rate of the CR system are considered with multiple eavesdroppers.
Here, it is assumed that e = 0:2; 
2 = 10 6, p = 1dB, s =  2dB and
min =  10dB. Figure 6.5 shows the eect of the step size on the primary and
secondary mean secrecy rates of the proposed system and those of the central
algorithm. Notably, the primary and secondary mean secrecy rates increase with
increasing step size. Additionally, the primary mean secrecy outage rate of the
PSMA outperforms that of the central algorithm signicantly, whereas the secondary
secrecy rate is slightly reduced compared to that of the central algorithm.
Figure 6.3: Secrecy rate vs. secondary power
Figure 6.3 indicates the eect of the secondary transmitter power on the secrecy
rate of the proposed system when the step size is  = 0:01. The proposed PSMA
performs signicantly better than the central matching, and even more so for small
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Figure 6.4: Secrecy rate vs. eavesdropper location
values of the secondary power. In contrast, the secondary secrecy rate is reduced
slightly compared to the central curve. Figure 6.4 shows the eect of eavesdropper
location on the secrecy rate of the proposed system when the step size is  = 0:01.
For all eavesdropper locations, the proposed PSMA can achieve a signicantly larger
secrecy rate than central matching.
Figure 6.6 shows that primary secrecy rate increases signicantly with
increasing p, whereas the secondary secrecy rate is independent of p. Figure 6.7
indicates that the secondary secrecy rate increases signicantly with increasing s
and the primary secrecy rate is independent of s.
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Figure 6.5: Secrecy rate vs. step size in Scenario II
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Figure 6.6: Secrecy rate vs. primary P in Scenario II
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In this chapter, a cooperative spectrum-sharing approach has been proposed for a
cognitive radio network consisting of multiple primary and secondary users. By
introducing well-designed utility functions, the problem of partner selection was
modelled as a one-to-one matching game that optimised the secrecy utility of both
primary and secondary networks. This PSMA was then applied to two scenarios for
a single eavesdropper and multiple eavesdroppers. The multiple eavesdroppers were
assumed to be distributed according to a homogeneous PPP. To solve the presented
matching game, a distributed algorithm (PSMA) was proposed, which produced a
high secrecy rate that outperformed the centralised algorithm. Simulation results
have shown that the proposed cooperative approach yields considerable gains in
terms of the secrecy rate compared to the centralised algorithm.
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Conclusions and future work
The aim of this thesis was to investigate challenges to PHY security in CRNs. The
thesis not only has contributed to the research community, but also has opened
interesting areas for future research. Each chapter of the thesis has proposed a
solution to an independent research problem, and hence the main contributions of
the thesis are summarised below, along with concluding remarks, to create an overall
picture of the research conducted.
Cooperative jamming was proposed to enhance primary secrecy rate, and a
new chaos-based cost function was introduced in order to design a power control
algorithm and analyse the dynamic spectrum-sharing issue in the uplink of cellular
CRNs. For secondary users as the game-players in underlay scenarios, utility/cost
functions were dened, taking into account the interference from and the interference
tolerance of the primary users. The existence of the Nash equilibrium was proven
for this power control game, which leads to signicantly lower power consumption
and a relatively fast convergence rate compared to existing game algorithms.
Simulation results indicated that the primary secrecy rate is signicantly improved
by cooperative jamming and the proposed power control algorithm achieves low
power consumption.
In addition, an integrated scheme was proposed with chaotic scrambling (CS),
chaotic articial noise, and a chaotic shift keying (CSK) scheme in an orthogonal
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frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)-based CR system to enhance its physical
layer security. By employing the chaos-based third-order Chebyshev map to achieve
the optimum bit error rate (BER) performance of CSK modulation, the proposed
three-layer integrated scheme was found to outperform the traditional OFDM system
in an overlay scenario with a Rayleigh fading channel. Importantly, under three
layers of encryption based on chaotic scrambling, chaotic articial noise, and CSK
modulation, a large key size can be generated to resist brute-force attacks and
eavesdropping, leading to a signicantly improved security rate.
Furthermore, a game theory-based cooperation scheme was investigated to
enhance physical layer (PHY) security in both the primary and secondary
transmissions of a cognitive radio network (CRN). In CRNs, the primary network
may decide to lease its own spectrum for a fraction of time to the secondary nodes
in exchange for appropriate remuneration. The secondary transmitter (ST) was
considered as a trusted relay for primary transmission in the presence of the ED. The
ST forwards a message from the primary transmitter (PT) in a decode-and-forward
(DF) fashion and, at the same time, allows part of its available power to be used to
transmit an articial noise (i.e., jamming signal) to enhance secrecy rates. In order to
allocate power between the message and jamming signals, a formulation and solution
were presented for the optimisation problem for maximising the primary secrecy
rate (PSR) and secondary secrecy rate (SSR) with malicious attempts from a single
eavesdropper or multiple eavesdroppers. The cooperation between the primary and
secondary transmitters was then analysed from a game-theoretic perspective, and
their interaction was modelled as a Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg equilibrium
was theoretically proven and computed. Finally, numerical examples were provided
to illustrate the impact of the Stackelberg game-based optimisation on the achievable
PSR and SSR. It was shown that spectrum leasing, based on trading secondary
access for cooperation by means of relay and a jammer, is a promising framework
for enhancing primary and secondary secrecy rates in cognitive radio networks when
the ED can intercept both primary and secondary transmissions.
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Finally, cooperative spectrum sharing was considered in a cognitive radio
network consisting of multiple primary and multiple secondary users. A
particular focus was the physical-layer security in cognitive radio networks wherein
multiple secondary nodes assist multiple primary nodes in combating unwanted
eavesdropping from a malicious eavesdroppers. Two scenarios were considered:
a single eavesdropper and multiple eavesdroppers. In Scenario I, the secondary
users play the game as a relay and jammer, whereas the secondary users play only
as jammers in Scenario II. Multiple eavesdroppers are distributed according to a
homogenous Poison point process (PPP). The primary and secondary secrecy rates
were examined to nd the solution of the developed matching game that yields a
stable matching between the sets of the primary and secondary users. The closed
forms for the outage probability and the mean secrecy rates for both the primary and
secondary transmissions were derived. Furthermore, the saleability and convergence
of matching theory were proved. Both the analytical and numerical results have
shown that the proposed matching model is a promising approach under which the
utility functions of both primary and secondary users are maximised.
The scope for future work in PHY security is extensive, and a few example
directions are discussed here. Possibilities for applications of physical layer security
techniques to commercially deployed wireless systems remain largely unexplored.
The majority of the techniques discussed in this thesis, such as articial noise
for eavesdropper jamming and CSI-based precoding to optimise secrecy rates, are
suitable for the underlying air interface (time/code/orthogonal frequency division
multiple access). For example, an OFDMA-based base station may choose to
transmit articial noise along with data symbols in certain subcarriers, provided
that spectral emission masks are not violated.
As physical layer security issues have been addressed and optimised in CRNs
via matching theory, it is expected that new multi-user network scenarios and
corresponding security schemes will continue to address and solve the security
challenges in these networks. Secrecy challenges in massive MIMO systems, smart
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grid systems, networks with simultaneous wireless information and power transfer,
and heterogeneous networks should be specied and optimised via cooperative
jamming and matching theory in future.
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Appendix A
Proofs from Chapter 4
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove the concavity of the primary transmission's utility, the second












(1 + (1  )se)2 )

: (A.1)
The second derivative in Eq. (A.1) is negative and hence the secrecy rate of
secondary transmission is concave in terms of .
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Following Lemma 1 in [31], the secrecy outage probability of the kth ST due to the
most malicious eavesdropper (E;k = max e;k) is presented as follows:














[1  P(Ps jhsej2  (2dx;k
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where Eq. (A.2) is achieved according to the PPP distribution of eavesdroppers [33].
In Eq. (A.3), it is possible to replace jzj = y and apply the probability generating














In addition to converting to polar coordinates, y = z2 is substituted in Eq. (A.4),
and Eq. (A.5) follows from the fact that the allocated secondary power Ps(1   )
is independent from the PPP distribution of eavesdroppers and t = Nk
2y=2
( (1 )k)Ps :
Finally, Eq. (A.6) emerges from the denition of the Gamma function.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The secrecy outage probability at the kth SR due to the nearest eavesdropper is































































where Eq. (A.7) follows from the PPP distribution of eavesdroppers. According to
[33] and [34], Eq. (A.8) holds when the distance between the kth ST and the nearest
eavesdropper follows
fE(x) = 2ex exp( ex2):
In Eq. (A.9), let  = 4, while u = x2 is used to obtain Eq. (A.10). Eq. (A.11) is
then obtained by the following formula:Z 1
0
















A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The mean secrecy rate when k > e;k is presented as follows:
Ee [Rkjk > e;k] = Ee [max[log2(1 + k)
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= Ee [log2(1 + k)





= Ee log2(1 + k)1(e0;k<k)   Ee
log2(1 + e0;k)1(min<e0;k<k)
(A.12)
= P(e0;k < k) log2(1 + e0;k)
 P(min < e0;k < k)
log2(1 + e0;k) (A.13)





fe0;k(y) log2(1 + y)dy;
(A.14)
where 1(:) is an indicator function. Eq. (C.10) considers the worst case of
eavesdropping by e0;k, which is bounded by min and k. Eq. (A.14) follows from






Proofs from Chapter 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove the concavity of the secondary transmission utility, the second












(1 + (1  )se)2

; (B.1)
where q = (1   )=(ln 2): It is evident that the second derivative in Eq. (B.1) is
negative. Thus, the utility of the secondary transmission is concave in terms of .
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
As all eavesdroppers are uniformly distributed around the ST and SR, it can be
assumed that
jhse;1j = jhse;2j = ::: = jhse;Lj
which leads to
se;1 = se;2 = ::: = se;L = se:
Also, it is assumed that
jhre;1j = jhre;2j = ::: = jhre;Lj:
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Therefore, the achievable USSEC is written as
USSEC = Rssec   k = Rss  Rse   k
= (1  )(log2(1 + ss)  log2(1+
Pshse
2 + PJ
hyreWJhre+ (1  )Pshse )
1A
  k: (B.2)
In order to prove the concavity of the utility of the secondary transmission, the














where q = (1   )=2 ln 2: The second derivative in Eq. (B.3) is negative, and
therefore the utility of the secondary transmission in colluding eavesdroppers is
concave in terms of .
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Appendix C
Proofs from Chapter 6
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove that the matching produced by the PSMA is not blocked by an individual,
it is rst noted that
 each relay will never receive a negative utility because, according to step 1-a
in the PSMA, the minimum oer is min; and
 each PT will only match with the ST in its demand set.
It will now be proven by contradiction that the matching produced by the PSMA
will not result in any blocking pairs. Dening the matching function of the PSMA
as  , it is assumed that PTib and STjb constitute a blocking pair. This implies that
there exists a ib;jb such that
UP
jb;ib




> US (i) : (C.2)
The following two conclusions can be drawn:
(C1): As USj is a decreasing function of  according to Eq. (6.15), it is the case
that
ib;jb < i; (i):
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C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(C2): As UPj;i is an increasing function of , it holds that
ib;jb >  (j);j:
It is clear that (C1) contradicts (C2), and therefore PTib and STjb are not matched.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The outage probability at lth receiver due to the non-colluding eavesdroppers
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2 
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According to [97], Eq. (C.3) consists of two terms. The rst
term, exp( i2jlj
Pp









, depends on the interference caused by the ST
jammer. The second term, denoted by the subscript I, can be solved by a Laplace




















C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
(C.4)
Eq. (C.4) follows from the assumption that fading is independent from the PPP,
and it is assumed that h
(SE)
l is independent from v
0
j. Moreover, it is assumed
that E[v0j] = exp(1=
p
N); and E[
h(SE)l ] = 1 [31]. Consequently, it is possible to




h(SE)l y v0j2] = exp(1=N ( 1 )) into Eq. (C.4) to obtain


















































































































According to [97], Eq. (C.6) holds when the distance between the ith PT and the
nearest eavesdropper follows
fE(x) = 2ex exp( ex2):
From Eq. (C.7), Eq. (C.8) can be obtained by letting u = jlj,  = 4 [31], and
y = jxj2. Subsequently, Eq. (C.9) can be obtained by the following formula:Z 1
0
















C.3 Proof of Lemma 3











































































where Eq. (C.10) follows from the PPP distribution of the eavesdroppers. According
to [97], Eq. (C.11) holds when the distance between the kth ST and the nearest
eavesdropper follows
fE(x) = 2ex exp( ex2):
In Eq. (C.12), letting  = 4 and u = x2 yields Eq. (C.13). Subsequently, Eq. (C.14)
can be obtained by the following formula:Z 1
0
















C.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The mean secrecy rate when k > e;k can be written as follows:
Ee [Rkjk > e;k] = Ee [max[(log2(1 + k)
  log2(1 + e;k))]]
= Ee [(log2(1 + k)
  log2(1 + e;k))] 1(e;k<k)
= (Ee(log2(1 + k)1(e;k<k)   Ee
log2(1 + e;k)1(e;k<k)) (C.15)
= (P(e;k < k) log2(1 + k)
 P(min < e;k < k)
log2(1 + e;k))
= (log2(1 + k)
1 PoE;k
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fe(x)log2(1 + x))dx: (C.16)





























































where 1(:) is an indicator function in Eq. (C.15). Additionally, e;k is the SINR at
the central processing point with respect to the kth user and represents the worst
case of eavesdropping. In Eq. (C.16), PoE ;k is given by P(E;k  k):
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